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I. INTRODUCTION
For at least a century the common law of Washington and
of virtually every state in the United States has permitted a citi-
zen to use deadly force in self-defense, but only if he was unlaw-
fully threatened, or appeared to be threatened, with death or
serious bodily harm.' Despite growing public fear of violent
crime' and recent statistics which provide a strong empirical
basis for that fear, 3 almost no state has expanded the common
law right to permit a citizen to use deadly force to resist unlaw-
ful violence to his person if he was not threatened with death or
serious bodily harm.4 It is no longer clear that the common law's
* B.A., J.D., Yale. Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. The
author gratefully wishes to acknowledge the extraordinary generosity of his colleague,
Professor George Nock, who unstintingly shared his extensive research for, and the man-
uscript of, his forthcoming book, WASHINGTON CRIMINAL LAW (an invaluable aid to the
practitioner) scheduled for publication in 1983 by Butterworth Legal Publishing. The
author also is indebted to the invaluable research assistance provided by Ms. Meg Jones-
Shelton, J.D., 1982 University of Puget Sound.
1. See State v. Brooks, 172 Wash. 221, 19 P.2d 924 (1933); State v. Lewis, 6 Wash.
App. 38, 491 P.2d 1062 (1971); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 993-1004 (2d ed. 1969); W. LA
FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 392-93 (1972); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04
(Proposed Official Draft 1962). See also, 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 179, 184 (Oxford 1769); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 478 (Lawyer's Literary Club ed. 1959).
2. See Raab, Crime Fear Seen Changing Habits Around the U.S., N.Y. Times, Sept.
17, 1980, at B5, col. 1 (private research poll indicates that "fear of crime has become so
'alarmingly pervasive' in the United States that it has altered the way people live
throughout the country"). See also Herbers, Fear of Crime Leads in Survey on Reasons
to Leave Big Cities, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1981, at A8, col. 1; The Curse of Violent
Crime, TIME, March 23, 1981, at 16, col. 1.
3. From 1970 to 1979, according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform
Crime Reports, the rate of violent crime increased a little more than five percent a year
on the average. From 1978 to 1979, the rate increased 10% and in the first half of 1980,
it increased 10% over the same period of 1979. Even though the number of serious
crimes reported to law enforcement agencies leveled off in 1981 and the crime rate for
that year decreased two per cent, the number of violent crimes increased one per cent for
that same year. N.Y. Times, August 27, 1982, at As, col. 1.
4. But see infra note 196.
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stringent rules limiting the use of deadly force to instances in
which the victim's life may be at stake are in accord with a shift-
ing public value system or are sufficiently protective of the indi-
vidual in these increasingly violent times.
Recently, Washington courts have applied the traditional
common law rules of self-defense in several provocative "hard
cases" which test the logic and impact of the traditional rules at
the margin and which thereby question the continued vitality of
the common law formulation.' In attempting both to preserve
the formal doctrine of the law governing the use of deadly force
in self-defense and to adjust to changing social conditions, these
courts have resolved the tension between rule and reality in a
very unsatisfactory manner. As a result of these decisions, the
basic common law structure of the rules of self-defense remains
formally intact, but the specific content and predictive applica-
tion of those rules no longer make much sense.
This article will set forth the primary theories which might
underlie the right of self-defense: necessity, duress, and personal
autonomy. It will then examine the common law and the law of
Washington governing the use of force in self-defense and
demonstrate that both are grounded primarily in the utilitarian
theory of necessity, which has as its primary objective the mini-
mization of social loss even at the cost of harm to individual
innocent victims. The article then will analyze the inadequate
manner in which Washington courts are resolving difficult cases
involving the use of deadly force in self-defense.
Finally, this article will argue that the law of self-defense
ought to be grounded primarily in the theory of personal auton-
omy and, accordingly, that the law should be changed explicitly
to permit recourse to deadly force by innocent victims against
aggressors whenever necessary to defend effectively against
unlawful violence. In addition, it will argue that such a shift in
underlying theory and explicit reformulation is not necessarily
inconsistent with utilitarian objectives and that, in any event
and more importantly, such a shift is necessary to insure that
the law is congruent with current public values and affords citi-
zens reasonable assurance of preserving their bodily integrity.
5. State v. McCullum, 98 Wash. 2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983); State v. Hanton, 94
Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980); State v. Wanrow, 88
Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977); State v. Adams, 31 Wash. App. 393, 641 P.2d 1207
(1982).
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II. THEORIES OF SELF-DEFENSE
The right of a citizen to use force, including deadly force, in
defense of self has strong historical antecedents in English com-
mon law.' Commentators have noted that different rationales
have been suggested to support the right of self-defense and the
rules which govern it.
A. Necessity
Most commentators ground the right of self-defense in the
common law principle of necessity.7 Though the common law
did not articulate the rationale particularly well, necessity is a
general authorizing principle which permits an individual under
certain circumstances to do what he must, including intention-
ally causing harm, in order to avoid an even greater harm. Clas-
sic examples of this authorizing rationale abound in the litera-
ture.8 Thus, the common law at a very early date permitted
individuals engaged in self-defense intentionally to cause harm
to others in order to avoid the imposition of harm on
themselves."
Since the doctrine of necessity was essentially based on a
utilitarian theory of justice, its overriding objective was to mini-
mize loss to society.10 This objective generated a subset of rules
governing the use of force (particularly the use of deadly force)
in self-defense that rigidly restricted the availability and the
scope of the right.
At common law an individual could use force in self-defense
if he reasonably perceived himself to be confronted with the
threat of imminent, unlawful force being used against him."1 As
a general proposition, he could not respond with deadly force if
6. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIRES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 179, 184 (Oxford
1769); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 588 (Lawyer's Liter-
ary Club ed. 1959).
7. See, e.g., J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 415-48 (2d ed. 1960); H.
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 103-35 (1968); Weschler & Michael, A
Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 701, 736 (1937).
8. See, e.g., Regina v. Dudley & Stevens, 14 Q.B:D. 273 (1884). For an interesting
sample of such examples, see Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47
S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1275 (1974).
9. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 179, 184 (Oxford
1769).
10. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 103-35 (1968).
11. W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 391-97 (1972); R. PERKINS,
CRIMINAL LAW 993-1004 (2d ed. 1969).
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he was confronted with nondeadly force. The rationale for this
limitation was to be found in the rationale of necessity and its
utilitarian objective. The common law would permit an innocent
victim12 to inflict intentional harm on an aggressor13 but would
not permit the purported victim to cause more harm than he
himself might have suffered."' This inherent limitation of a pro-
portional response-i.e., proportional to the harm
threatened-insured that no greater harm (such as the death of
the aggressor) would be suffered by society than the harm actu-
ally threatened by the aggressor (a mere physical battery to the
victim).
Common law courts essentially engaged in interest-balanc-
ing, weighing the respective interests at risk in confrontations
involving force.' Most courts generally concluded that when
possible physical harm to an aggressor was weighed against pos-
sible physical harm to an innocent victim, the interest of the vic-
tim in physical security should be given preference because he
was the "innocent" party.'" Courts in choosing between two
interests of essentially equal value (i.e., bodily security of two
individuals) weighed the aggressor's interest as of lesser value.1 7
12. An "innocent victim," as used in this article, refers to any individual who is
confronted with unlawful force (whether nondeadly or deadly) and who was not at fault
in initiating the violent confrontation.
13. An "aggressor," as used in this article, refers to any person who unlawfully initi-
ates a violent confrontation with another person and unlawfully uses or threatens to use
imminent force (whether deadly or nondeadly) against that person.
14. See generally H. PACKER, THE LIMITs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 103-35 (1968);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
15. See Comment, Justification for the Use of Force in Criminal Law, 13 STAN. L.
REV. 566, 572-85 (1961).
16. It may- be that the common law permitted victims to resort to self-defense in
such cases as a method of shifting the risk of harm to the aggressor, thereby reducing the
aggregate harm that might otherwise occur if victims were limited to after-the-fact reme-
dies of private tort actions and public criminal prosecutions.
17. Though the life of the aggressor superficially might be considered as valuable as
the life of the victim, the process of interest-balancing is more complicated. As Fletcher
puts it:
[Necessity as a justification] permits one to kill in the name of an interest less
valuable than life by adding another factor to the balancing process. In the
typical case of self-defence, the additional factor is the culpability of the
aggressor. The culpability of the aggressor is used as a rationale for diminish-
ing the interests of the aggressor relative to those of the victim. The argument
would be that one simply cannot balance the life of a culpable aggressor
against the life of an innocent victim on the assumption that the two combat-
ants are equally situated. The man who chooses to start the fight is held to be
entitled to lesser protection than the innocent victim. The problem of course is
how significant the factor of culpability ought to be in diminishing the inter-
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One strains hard to find much in the way of persuasive analysis
by courts as to why the victim's interest in bodily security
should be given preference, yet this result seems to be clearly in
accord with prevailing social values.
The emphasis on minimizing social loss and its concomitant
expression in rule form that an innocent victim threatened only
with physical harm cannot resort to deadly force in self-defense
necessarily allocated to the victim the risk that his limited
response, though proportional, would not be effective.1 8 Thus, in
order to maximize social gain by preserving the life of the
aggressor, 9 the innocent victim might be required to accept as a
personal cost the infliction of physical harm. Distribution of this
risk to any particular victim was perceived simply as the inevita-
ble cost of minimizing the net social loss. Of course an innocent
victim who suffered such a loss personally, though without an
effective private remedy at that moment, did have the prospec-
tive (and contingent) public remedy of arrest and prosecution at
a later time to vindicate, at least in part, his private interest.20
ests of the aggressor. This is the critical factor in deciding whether self-defence
ought to be available to defend against rape, castration, maiming, and theft as
well as against homicide. The more significantly one regards the culpability of
the aggressor, the less significant the victim's interest has to be for the victim
to have the right to use deadly force, if necessary, to repel the attack.
Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative
Criminal Theory, 8 ISR. L. REv. 367, 377 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher, The
Psychotic Aggressor]. Kadish, however, argues that the "balance of utilities" does not
adequately explain why an innocent victim is permitted under specific conditions to kill
his aggressor. He concludes that a theoretical explanation based on calculating social
utilities violates the principle of equality which asserts that "the lives of all persons must
be regarded as of equal value." Furthermore, he notes that the common law permitted a
victim to take life even when lesser interests were threatened. Thus, a victim could kill
to prevent rape or kidnapping. See Kadish, Respect for Life and Regard for Rights in
the Criminal Law, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 871, 882 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kadish,
Respect for Life].
18. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 996 (2d ed. 1969); Fletcher, The Psychotic
Aggressor, supra note 17, at 367. An "effective" response in defense of self is used in this
article to indicate protective measures taken in self-defense, including recourse to deadly
force, which will enable a victim to repel successfully the unlawful application of violence
to his person. For a specific application of this definition see infra notes 161-71 and
accompanying text.
19. The common law considered human life as the supreme value and, consequently,
subordinated most other interests in order to maximize the preservation of human life.
For an excellent discussion of this priority, see Kadish, Respect for Life, supra note 17,
at 878-81.
20. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 996 (2d ed. 1969).
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B. Duress
Other rationales have been offered to explain the availabil-
ity of the right to use force in self-defense. Some commentators
have suggesed that it may be more properly grounded in the
general principle of duress." Duress under the common law was
a doctrine which excluded a person from criminal responsibility
for acts he committed as a result of some form of recognized
compulsion which overcame his will." An individual who acted
under duress acted intentionally but did not make a "true
choice" to act, given the pressure to which he was subjected."
Thus, intentionally using force to harm another human
being in self-defense can be seen as responding under conditions
of stress in which the threat to one's self-interest (life or bodily
security) inevitably causes an individual to act in a predictable
self-defensive fashion. Commentators have suggested that not
only is the use of force in self-defense a predictable human
response, it is also not deterrable. 4
Whether self-defense is grounded in the rationale of neces-
sity or duress can have important theoretical as well.as practical
consequences. 6 Most importantly, this choice of grounding may
determine whether the act of the victim was "justified" or
"excused. 2 6 On the one hand, if the victim's act of self-defense
21. See H. PACKER, THE LIMrrS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 114-18 (1968). But see
Kadish, Respect for Life, supra note 17, at 881. Kadish claims that people in fact regard
intentional killing of aggressors as "justifiable." Additionally, he argues that a theory of
self-defense which rests on presumed compulsion does not explain all instances in which
the law permits an individual to take intentionally the life of an aggressor. Specifically, it
does not explain why the law permits a third party coming to the aid of an innocent
victim to take, under specified circumstances, the life of an aggressor. Kadish seemingly
concludes that the third party could be deterred by the threat of punishment not to kill
the aggressor. Whether his conclusion would stand up when there is a "special relation-
ship" between the victim and the third party (such as parent or spouse) is an interesting
question as he admits. Id. at 881.
22. See W. LA FAVE & A. Sco'r, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 374-81 (1972). It is
also possible to characterize this model as a form of "necessity" which functions as an
excuse, not as a justification. In either case, this model essentially focuses on the inevita-
bility that the victim will necessarily be compelled to kill the aggressor in order to pre-
serve his own life. See Fletcher, The Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 17, at 376-77.
23. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 829-34 (1978); Fletcher, The
Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 17, at 367-75.
24. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 113-18 (1968).
25. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. It should be noted that most com-
mentators seemingly do not consider the doctrine of self-defense to be grounded prima-
rily in the theory of duress.
26. Conduct that is "justified" can be considered broadly as conduct which is, under
the particular circumstances, not unlawful and, consequently, no criminal responsibility
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is grounded in necessity and thus is seen as justified, it is consid-
ered to be a correct and appropriate social response which soci-
ety ought to permit, and even encourage. If, on the other hand,
it is seen as grounded in duress, an act of violence to another in
self-defense is considered as a personal excuse avoiding individ-
ual criminal responsibility because of the absence of a necessary
condition for criminal responsibility, i.e., the opportunity for
true choice.17
C. Vindication of Autonomy
A perceptive and influential contemporary scholar of crimi-
nal law has suggested that the right to use force in self-defense
ought to be grounded not in necessity or duress but rather in the
vindication of the victim's interest in autonomy."' Broadly
stated, this principle holds that an aggressor's unilateral act of
aggression places him outside the protection of the law 9 and,
more importantly, constitutes a breach of the victim's intimate
zone of privacy and personal security.30 Both because the aggres-
sor has by his own action forfeited consideration of his interests
by the law and, more significantly, because the interest invaded
is considered of absolute importance, the victim is authorized to
take whatever steps are necessary to repel the intruder and to
may be imposed upon the individual defendant for behaving as he did. Conduct that is
"excused" can broadly be described as unlawful but for which personal criminal respon-
sibility cannot be imposed on the particular defendant. For a sophisticated analysis of
these two concepts see G. FLETCHER, RTMNKING CRIMINAL LAW 759-817 (1978); Kadish,
Respect for Life, supra note 17, at 874-77. See also Fletcher, The Psychotic Aggressor,
supra note 17, at 373.
27. Characterizing exculpatory claims either as issues of justification or of excuse
may have practical consequences. Arguably, the government might be required to negate
claims of justification while defendants might be required to establish claims of excuse.
See infra notes 93-159 and accompanying text.
28. See G. FLETCHER, RErHINKING CRiMINAL LAw 860-75 (1978); Fletcher, The
Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 17, at 378-79.
29. Fletcher, The Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 17, at 379-80. According to
Fletcher, John Locke considered an aggressor to be in a state of war with the victim,
thereby breaching an implied contract among autonomous agents to respect each other's
personal living space. Id. at 380. Kadish rejects this argument, asserting that it is merely
a legal conclusion which does not adequately explain why an aggressor should forfeit any
protection under the law and that it does not explain all cases of self-defense, specifically
those involving nonculpable aggressors such as children or the insane. See Kadish,
Respect for Life, supra note 17, at 883-84.
30. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 860-75 (1978); Fletcher, The Psychotic
Aggressor, supra note 17, at 378-79. This theory does not rest on a conflict of interests
which requires weighing by the law. Rather, it postulates an absolute right to repel
aggression to a vital personal interest.
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restore the sanctity of his personal domain.31 This theory of self-
defense is dominant in both German and Soviet criminal law.s2
Needless to say, this theory of self-defense does not depend
on interest-balancing nor does it have as its objective the mini-
mization of social loss. Rather its goal is to preserve and protect
for each individual a private sphere of personal safety. As a con-
sequence, effectiveness of response is its overriding first princi-
ple of authorization. There is no overriding principle of limita-
tion, such as proportionality, which would impose an absolute
limit on the victim's response in order to protect a counter-
vailing interest of the aggressor. 3
III. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
Washington's law of self-defense is, with minor adjustments,
essentially that of the common law. Though statutory in form, 
3
31. The primary concern of this theory of self-defense is the nature of the interest
invaded. Fletcher puts it this way: "The focus is not upon the culpability of the aggres-
sor, but rather on the autonomy of the innocent agent. The assumption is that an inno-
cent agent has a right to prevent encroachment upon his autonomy." Fletcher, The
Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 17, at 379. Kadish adopts a theoretical justification for
self-defense that is very similar. He grounds the doctrine in the right of the individual to
resist aggression personally as deriving from the individual's right to the law's protection
which is not surrendered by the establishment of the state's authority. Kadish, Respect
for Life, supra note 17, at 884-86. It is likely that most citizens today would prefer the
vindication of autonomy rationale and the rules generated by it. See infra notes 182-97
and accompanying text.
32. Fletcher, The Psychotic Aggressor, supra note 17, at 379.
33. Id. at 381-87. This theory does not require an assessment of the culpability or
blameworthiness of the aggressor in intruding upon the personal autonomy of the vic-
tims. Rather it focuses on the act of intrusion and the right to repel or nullify such
hostile intrusion. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW, 863-64 (1978). Conse-
quently, this theory would permit an innocent victim to use deadly force with its con-
comitant risk of death to repel an aggressor who only threatens the victim with
nondeadly force or with less than grievous bodily harm even if the aggressor could not be
held criminally responsible for his acts of aggression.
34. Washington's statutory law purports to regulate the lawful use of force and to
define justifiable or excusable homicide. The current statutory scheme has not changed
significantly since first enacted in 1909. The relevant statutes are:
Definitions. In this chapter, unless a different meaning is plainly
required:
"Necessary" means that no reasonably effective alternative to the use of
force appeared to exist and that the amount of force used was reasonable to
effect the lawful purpose intended.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.010 (1981).
Use of Force-When lawful. The use, attempt, or offer to use force
upon or toward the person of another is not unlawful in the following cases:
(1) Whenever necessarily used by a public officer in the performance of a
legal duty, or a person assisting him and acting under his direction;
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Washington courts have made it clear in recent cases that the
(2) Whenever necessarily used by a person arresting one who has commit-
ted a felony and delivering him to a public officer competent to receive him
into custody;
(3) Whenever used by a party about to be injured, or by another lawfully
aiding him, in preventing or attempting to prevent an offense against his per-
son, or a malicious trespass, or other malicious interference with real or per-
sonal property lawfully in his possession, in case the force is not more than is
necessary;
(4) Whenever reasonably used by a person to detain someone who enters
or remains unlawfully in a building or on real property lawfully in the posses-
sion of such person, so long as such detention is reasonable in duration and
manner to investigate the reason for the detained person's presence on the
premises, and so long as the premises in question did not reasonably appear to
be intended to be open to members of the public;
(5) Whenever used in a reasonable and moderate manner by a parent or
his authorized agent, a guardian, master, or teacher in the exercise of lawful
authority, to restrain or correct his child, ward, apprentice, or scholar;
(6) Whenever used by a carrier of passengers or his authorized agent or
servant, or other person assisting them at their request in expelling from a
carriage, railway car, vessel, or other vehicle, a passenger who refuses to obey a
lawful and reasonable regulation proscribed for the conduct of passengers, if
such vehicle has first been stopped and the force used is not more than is nec-
essary to expel the offender with reasonable regard to his personal safety;
(7) Whenever used by any person to prevent a mentally ill, mentally
incompetent, or mentally disabled person from committing an act dangerous to
himself or another, or in enforcing necessary restraint for the protection of his
person, or his restoration to health, during such period only as is necessary to
obtain legal authority for the restraint or custody of his person.
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.16.020 (1982).
Homicide-When excusable. Homicide is excusable when committed
by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without
criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent.
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.16.030 (1982).
Justifiable homicide by public officer. Homicide is justifiable when
committed by a public officer, or person acting under his command and in his
aid, in the following cases:
(1) In obedience to the judgment of a competent court.
(2) When necessary to overcome actual resistance to the execution of the
legal process, mandate, or order of a court or officer, or in the discharge of a
legal duty.
(3) When necessary in retaking an escaped or rescued prisoner who has
been committed, arrested for, or convicted of a felony; or in arresting a person
who has committed a felony and is fleeing from justice; or in attempting, by
lawful ways or means, to apprehend a person for a felony actually committed;
or in lawfully suppressing a riot or preserving the peace.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040 (1981).
Homicide-By other person-When justifiable. Homicide is also
justifiable when committed either:
(1) In the lawful defense of the slayer, or his or her husband, wife, parent,
child, brother, or sister, or of any other person in his presence or company,
when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of the per-
son slain to commit a felony or to do some great personal injury to the slayer
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legislature, in enacting the current statutory scheme, intended to
confirm the common law rules of self-defense."
Like the common law, 6 Washington distinguishes between
the victim's right to use nondeadly force and deadly force. 7
Which force, deadly or nondeadly, a victim can use in self-
defense depends on the nature of the harm threatened. 8 As a
practical matter, however, this principle frequently (though not
always") limits a victim to respond in kind to the force used or
or to any such person, and there is imminent danger of such design being
accomplished; or
(2) In the actual resistance of an attempt to commit a felony upon the
slayer, in his presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode, in
which he is.
WASH. Rav. CODE § 9A.16.050 (1981).
35. State v. Fischer, 23 Wash. App. 756, 598 P.2d 742 (1979); State v. Bailey, 22
Wash. App. 646, 591 P.2d 1212 (1979). Most courts have reached this conclusion in a
rather perfunctory manner, relying on inferred "legislative intent" from enactment of the
statutory provisions. This finesse has permitted courts to avoid confronting the fact that
the clear language of the relevant Washington statutes creates an extraordinarily gener-
ous right of self-defense. WASH. Rav. CODE § 9A.16.050(2) (1981), for example, would, if
not limited by the common law, permit a victim to take human life in resisting a felony
committed by an aggressor in his presence. See supra note 34.
36. See W. LA FAvE & A. Scor, HANDsOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 391-94 (1972).
37. Deadly force may be defined as force (a) which its user uses with intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury to another or (b) which he knows creates a substantial risk
of death or serious bodily injury to the other. The definition thus focuses on the objec-
tives of the user to cause serious harm or on the probability that such harm might occur
rather than on whether it actually did occur. See W. LA FAv & A. Scorr, HANDBOOK ON
CRMINAL LAW 392 (1972); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
"Great bodily harm" is defined in WASH. PArTERN JURv INSTRUCTONs-CIMINAL § 2.04
(1980) as any serious hurt or injury that is seriously painful or hard to bear. Occasionally
trial courts have been reversed for giving a misleading definition of "great bodily harm."
E.g., State v. Painter, 27 Wash. App. 708, 620 P.2d 1001 (1980) (trial court reversed for
instructing jury that "great bodily harm means an injury of a more serious nature than
an ordinary striking with the hands or fist" even though this instruction appears to state
accurately the common law rule). The plain meaning of the words suggests that the
aggressor's conduct must threaten an injury which could result in death, thus preserving
the interest-balancing analysis and minimization of the loss of life implicit in the com-
mon law defense. Yet there is some flexibility in the definition permitting factfinders to
determine that threatened harm less serious than death might justify the use of deadly
force in self-defense. Cf. Cook v. Gisler, 20 Wash. App. 677, 582 P.2d 550 (1978) (court
held that a threatened sadistic sexual assault by a husband upon his wife could consti-
tute a threat of great bodily harm); State v. Lewis, 6 Wash. App. 38, 491 P.2d 1062
(1971) (court defined "grievous bodily harm" as an injury of a graver and more serious
nature than an ordinary battery with the fist or pounding with the hand; an injury of
such a nature as to produce severe pain, suffering or injury)." "Nondeadly" force is, in
effect, a residual concept. It refers to force that is not likely to cause death or great
bodily harm. See W. LA FAvE & A. Scor, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 392 (1972).
38. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
39. Cf. Cook v. Gisler, 20 Wash. App. 677, 582 P.2d 550 (1978) (court concluded that
victim, threatened with a sadistic sexual act by her unarmed husband, could use deadly
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threatened by the aggressor.
It is useful at this juncture to set forth the law of self-
defense as understood by Washington courts. There are several
elements that must be satisfied to claim the right to use
nondeadly force intentionally against another person in self-
defense.
The victim must have an honest 40 and reasonable"4 belief
based on appearances that another person is threatening him
with the imminent application' of nondeadly force to his person
and that recourse to nondeadly force is necessary in order to
avoid the harm threatened.43 In order to use deadly force
against an aggressor, a victim must have an honest and reasona-
ble belief based on appearances that another person is threaten-
ing him with imminent death or great bodily harm and that it is
necessary to resort to deadly force in order to avoid the serious
harm threatened.4
The requirement that the unlawful force or harm
threatened by the aggressor be "imminent" serves an important
force in self-defense).
40. In order to qualify as "honest" the actor himself must subjectively have believed
that he was threatened. The focus is on the actual state of mind of the actor at the time
of the incident. Cf. State v. Fischer, 23 Wash. App. 756, 598 P.2d 742 (1979) (trial court
reversed for failing to give a self-defense instruction that made "the subjective standard
manifestly apparent to the average juror." Id. at 759).
41. The concept of "reasonable belief" introduces an objective standard into the
jury's determination. The factfinder must determine that the actor's perception was con-
gruent with that of the so-called "reasonable person" under the same circumstances at
the time of the confrontation. This insures that the actor's behavior was consistent with
a community standard of behavior applicable to all members of society. It also protects
against feigning by persons who kill or harm another knowing they are not threatened
but who intend to prevaricate in order to avoid criminal responsibility. See H.L.A. HART,
PUNISHMENT AND RESPoNsmEnrrv 33 (2d ed. 1978). See also infra note 89 and accompany-
ing text. Recently, this concept has been badly handled by several Washington courts.
See infra notes 162-68 & 173-80, and accompanying text. See also State v. Wanrow, 88
Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977), State v. Hill, 76 Wash. 2d 557, 458 P.2d 171 (1969);
State v. Tyree, 143 Wash. 313, 255 P. 382 (1927); State v. Miller, 141 Wash. 104, 250 P.
645 (1926); State v. Dunning, 8 Wash. App. 340, 506 P.2d 321 (1973); 3 J. STEPHEN, A
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF ENGLAND 12 (1883).
42. "Imminent" requires the jury to find that the victim honestly and reasonably
believed that the aggressor intended to inflict serious bodily injury in the very near
future. If the threatened violence is more remote in time, the victim may have an alter-
native course of action (other than intentionally causing death or serious bodily injury)
to avoid the threatened harm. See generally W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 394 (1972).
43. State v. Strand, 20 Wash. App. 768, 582 P.2d 874 (1978).
44. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(i) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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function. This element establishes that a choice between two
evils (harm to the aggressor or harm to the victim) was in fact
necessary, and that there was an occasion which actually
required the individual (and society) to minimize loss. Of course,
one difficulty generated by this requirement is the disadvantage
it imposes on the victim by effectively delaying a self-protective
response until the aggressor has explicitly initiated the violent
confrontation. The aggressor has thereby gained the advantage
of choosing the place and the time for violence and, perhaps,
also achieved the benefit of surprise. In this sense, the require-
ment also limits the effectiveness of a victim's response.'
The rules governing the use of force in self-defense are
straightforward and comprehensible. It is, however, important to
analyze the theoretical bases which seemingly underlie these
rules.
First, the common law frequently casts the rules in terms of
the force threatened or used by the aggressor and not in terms
of the harm threatened or likely to occur. Implicit in the com-
mon law's verbal formulation is the strong presumption that
only deadly force threatened by an aggressor is likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury. Put conversely, the common law
rules seem to assume that an aggressor who does not explicitly
threaten deadly force or is not armed with a deadly weapon will
not cause death or serious bodily injury.' Thus, as a practical
matter, the law permits a victim to meet nondeadly force only
with nondeadly force. Only if the aggressor is armed with a
deadly weapon or if the victim can otherwise demonstrate that
he honestly and reasonably believed that the aggressor intended
45. See supra note 42.
46. Of course, the requirement of "imminent" also functions to minimize "mistakes"
by requiring the victim to perceive behavior which manifests a threat to his personal
security. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. For a provocative and lively
debate of an analogous problem in the definition of criminal attempt, see G. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 115-235 (1978); Weinreb, Manifest Criminality, Criminal
Intent, and the "Metamorphosis of Larceny," 90 YALE L.J. 294 (1980).
47. Washington courts have defined "great bodily harm" to mean "any serious hurt
or injury or one that is seriously painful or hard to bear." State v. Painter, 27 Wash.
App. 708, 620 P.2d 1001 (1981); WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 2.04
(Supp. 1982). It should be noted that at common law a person could be convicted of
murder if he only intended to cause serious bodily injury to his victim but in fact caused
death. The rationale of this formulation is clear: there is always a substantial risk that
death may occur because such conduct is very dangerous. See W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 540-41 (1972). Thus, permitting a victim to respond with
deadly force when threatened with great bodily harm is, in effect, authorizing him to
take life lest his own life be put at risk.
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to use force in a manner which risked death or great bodily
harm is he permitted to respond with deadly force.4
Washington, however, makes the kind of force a victim is
permitted to use in self-defense dependent on the nature of the
harm threatened by the aggressor. Thus, a victim can use deadly
force in self-defense if the aggressor threatens him with death or
great bodily harm.49 If the aggressor's threat does not rise to
that level of violence, a victim can only use nondeadly force in
self-defense. Until recently though, it was not unusual for trial
courts in Washington to instruct the jury that a mere battery
inflicted by fists could not constitute a threat of serious bodily
harm.50
These rules have built into them the same "balancing-of-
interests" or "choice-of-lesser-evils" principle which is at the
heart of the utilitarian theory of necessity. 1 That is, a victim
may cause physical harm to avoid physical harm. He may use
deadly force, however, with its high risk of loss of human life or
serious bodily injury only to avoid a loss of equal magnitude, i.e.,
death or great bodily harm to himself. Consequently, the law of
Washington, like the common law of other jurisdictions, makes
proportionality the overriding principle governing resort to
force by victims. Effectiveness of a victim's response is subordi-
nated to proportionality in order to minimize social loss.52
One inevitable consequence of these rules is that innocent
48. There is a certain tautological quality to the definition of "deadly force." It is in
fact not defined in terms of its own inherent nature or capacity to cause harm (such as a
firearm) but rather in terms of the actor's intention to cause serious harm or his aware-
neps of risk that its use will cause serious harm. See supra note 37. Thus, conceivably an
unarmed aggressor who is large and powerful and who intends to inflict serious bodily
injury on his victim with his fists can be considered to be using deadly force. However, a
victim who responds with deadly force to an aggressor not armed with a weapon is at
significant risk since he must persuade the jury that he was threatened with serious bod-
ily injury in order to be subsequently vindicated for his actions. If he fails, his exposure
includes the possibility of conviction for first or second degree murder.
49. WASH. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONs-CRIMINAL § 16.02 (Supp. 1982). Washington
cases, however, tend to find that an aggressor did not threaten to cause death or great
bodily harm unless the aggressor used deadly force. Cf. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d
221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (jury seemingly rejected female defendant's claim of self-
defense when much larger male aggressor was unarmed and defendant used deadly
force); State v. Painter, 27 Wash. App. 708, 620 P.2d 1001 (1981) (jury seemingly
rejected female defendant's claim of self-defense when defendant used deadly force
against unarmed male aggressor).
50. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 6 Wash. App. 38, 491 P.2d 1062 (1971).
51. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
52. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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victims when confronted with nondeadly force by an aggressor
generally may not use deadly force in self-defense even in cases
in which it is clear that deadly force would probably be the only
effective force they could use.53 This limitation on the private
remedy of self-defense compels many victims by threat of crimi-
nal prosecution to accept their individual loss of physical harm
or worse in order to minimize possible social loss of death or
serious injury to the aggressor." In effect, it requires the victims
to be satisfied with the contingent public remedy of arrest, pros-
ecution, conviction, and punishment as the involuntary quid pro
quo for foregoing effective private self-help.55
The law of self-defense appears to be founded on another
curious factual assumption: that aggressors and victims alike
enjoy rough parity in strength. Common law rules which may
have had primary application in violent confrontations between
mature males may make less sense when, increasingly, victims
include females, senior citizens, and children." It seems fair to
assume that in most cases these kinds of victims will be unable
to defend themselves against any unlawful violence by mere
physical force.
Another implicit premise of the common law rules of self-
defense is that the nature of the harm sought to be avoided by
the victim can be gauged accurately by examining the nature of
the force threatened or used by the aggressor. Thus, the com-
53. The victim is generally relegated to attempting to persuade the jury that he
honestly and reasonably feared death or great bodily harm at the hands of the aggressor.
Cf. State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977) (diminutive female claimed
she feared great bodily harm at the hands of large, intoxicated male who allegedly
accosted her in the company of three of her friends, two male and one female). State v.
Painter, 27 Wash. App. 708, 620 P.2d 1001 (1980) (female victim claimed she feared
serious bodily injury at hands of her unarmed stepson).
54. Some commentators have explicitly acknowledged this consequence. Perkins
states in his treatise: "Deadly force is not privileged in defense against nondeadly force
[footnote omitted]. For example, one must submit to a box on the ear and seek redress in
the courts if he is unable to prevent it by means other than resort to deadly force." R.
PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 996 (2d ed. 1969).
55. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text; supra note 54.
56. See supra cases cited note 53. See also Elderly Shoppers, Leave Fears at Home,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1981, at B1, col. 1. For an interesting survey of recent Washington
cases in which women resorted to deadly force to defend themselves against male aggres-
sors see Brown, In Self-Defense: Prejudice Impedes Justice for Women Who Kill to
Save Their Own Lives, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov. 14, 1982, at B1, col. 3. The out-
comes in the numerous cases cited by the author appear to be inconsistent and unpre-
dictable. See also Crime and the Elderly-What Your Community Can Do, Hearings
Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 96th Cong. 1st Seas. (1980).
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mon law seems to presume that an aggressor who does not use or
threaten to use a deadly weapon does not intend or will not
cause death or serious bodily injury. 7 Washington law does not
create a presumption to this effect, but it effectively casts on the
victim the difficult burden of persuading the jury that an
unarmed aggressor threatened (or appeared to threaten) death
or great bodily harm.58 As will be discussed,5 9 it may not be pos-
sible to gauge either as a matter of law" or of fact6 ' the inten-
tion of today's violent criminals or the probable outcome of vio-
lent confrontation by ascertaining whether aggressors are armed
with deadly force.
IV. SUBSIDIARY RULES OF SELF-DEFENSE
There are additional rules governing the right of self-
defense in Washington.
A. No Duty to Retreat
In Washington an innocent victim is under no duty to
retreat even if he knows that he could do so with complete
impunity.62 Failure to require a victim to exercise this alterna-
tive remedy if available is actually inconsistent with the utilitar-
ian goal of minimizing social loss.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code reached a contrary
conclusion with respect to the use of deadly force, concluding
that most citizens would, in a moment of quiet reflection subse-
quent to the violent confrontation, prefer to have suffered the
temporary ignominy of retreating rather than to have taken a
human life.6" To this extent, Washington's failure to impose a
57. As noted earlier, deadly force is not defined explicitly in terms of deadly weapon
or instrumentality, but rather in terms of the user's intention or awareness of its danger-
ousness. Thus, to limit a victim's ability to respond with deadly force to instances in
which he is threatened with deadly force may require him to assess accurately the user's
intention-a very difficult task. See supra note 37.
58. See supra notes 48 & 53 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 47-49 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
62. State v. Meyer, 96 Wash. 257, 164 P. 926 (1917); State v. Lewis, 6 Wash. App.
38; 491 P.2d 1062 (1971).
63. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(iii) comment at 24-25 (Tent. Draft No. 8 1958).
The Code does not, however, require a victim to retreat from his dwelling place or place
of work. Nor need he retreat if he is assaulted in his dwelling by another person whose
dwelling it is also. In part, the drafters of the Code concluded that the duty to retreat in
all cases but those just mentioned (if retreat is available and without risk to the victim)
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duty to retreat can be seen as adopting in part the preservation
of autonomy rationale which has been suggested as the underly-
ing rationale of self-defense.6 4 A victim will be permitted to
stand his ground and defend his personal zone of privacy and
security rather than yield it to a violent, intruding aggressor
even if standing one's ground and keeping intact one's zone of
personal autonomy results in the loss of human life. 5
B. Use of Deadly Force Versus Outcome
Like the common law, the law of Washington does not let
the privilege of using deadly force in self-defense turn on the
outcome of its use in any particular case. Thus, an innocent vic-
tim may use deadly force under specified conditions. The privi-
lege to use such force will not depend on whether its use in fact
took human life or caused serious bodily injury.
This approach makes sense since the outcome of using
deadly force in any specific instance is not predictable because it
is dependent on too many variables including, among others,
marksmanship, range, and movement of the participants. More-
over, a primary purpose of the law is to specify in advance of
is consistent with the utilitarian theory of minimizing loss since it is not necessary for
the victim to injure his attacker if he can avoid the harm to himself by retreating. See
also 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 179, 185 (Oxford 1769).
64. Washington courts have not provided a satisfactory explanation of why a victim
is under no duty to retreat before using force. Probably the best attempt at such an
explanation is set forth by the court in State v. Meyer, 96 Wash. 257, 164 P. 926 (1917):
[T]he ancient doctrine of the common law, that the right of self-defense did
not arise until every effort to escape had been resorted to, even to the point of
retreating until an impassable barrier was reached, has been supplanted in
many of the American states, including the state of Washington, by the more
reasonable doctrine and the one more in keeping with the dictates of human
nature, to the effect that, when one is feloniously assaulted in a place he has
the right to be and is placed in danger, either real or apparent, of losing his life
or of suffering great bodily harm at the hands of his assailant, he is not
required to retreat or to endeavor to escape, but may stand his ground and
repel force with force, even to taking the life of his assailant if necessary, or in
good reason apparently necessary, for the preservation of his own life or to
protect himself from great bodily harm.
Id. at 264, 164 P. at 928 (emphasis added). The court also may have considered self-
defense to be based on the concept of excuse rather than justification since it seemed to
conclude that most people would in fact defend themselves rather than retreat. Argua-
bly, this type of stress may exert irresistible pressure on humans to act in a self-defen-
sive manner. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
65. Not requiring a victim to retreat can also be explained by utilitarian objectives.
Arguably, a victim can increase his disadvantage and the risk of harm to himself by
retreating, rather than engaging in self-defense.
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conduct when risk-creation is permissible.6 To impose liability
on the basis of the subsequent result violates our intuitive sense
of the prohibition against ex post facto law.8 7 It also might
excessively inhibit the resort to deadly force, further vitiating
any meaningful right to defend oneself by deadly force.
C. Mistakes and the Justificatory Effect of Appearances
A pervasive problem in substantive criminal law in general,
and in the law of self-defense in particular, is that of mistakes.
s
The generic problem arises when appearances are not in fact
congruent with reality. Yet the law must permit and encourage
citizens to respond appropriately to their environment as it is
generally perceived. 9 The problem is particularly acute in cases
of self-defense because the time for decision is often very brief,
limiting the opportunity for further inquiry and clarification.
Also the consequence of action or inaction can be grave.
The dilemma posed is whether, subject to the rules dis-
cussed earlier, the right to use either deadly or nondeadly force
in self-defense should be permitted only in cases in which an
aggressor is in fact threatening harm to the victim. Like the
common law, Washington does not so limit the privilege.70
Rather, it permits a victim to use force in self-defense if he hon-
estly and reasonably believes that an aggressor is threatening
him. The requirement that the victim's belief be honest imposes
on him the duty that he sincerely believes he is acting in self-
defense. The requirement that the belief be reasonable (and
thus conform to an objective standard) helps insure that the vic-
tim was not feigning his claim of self-defense and that his
response was in fact generated by the external world.7 1 It also
66. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(1)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
67. U.S. CONsT. art. I § 9, cl. 3, § 10, cl. 1. J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CmIMI-
NAL LAW 58-59 (2d ed. 1960). See also Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964);
Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 470 P.2d 617, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1970).
68. La Fave and Scott state: "No area of the substantive criminal law has tradition-
ally been surrounded by more confusion than that of ignorance or mistake of fact or
law." W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 356 (1972).
69. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 707-13 (1978).
70. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.050 (1981); W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 393 (1972); 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND at
12 (1883). Cf. State v. Penn., 89 Wash. 2d 63, 568 P.2d 797 (1977) (one is justified in
going to the defense of another whom he reasonably believes not to be the aggressor even
though the belief subsequently turns out to be erroneous).
71. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 707-13 (1978).
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serves as a generalized standard of lawful behavior permitting
the factfinder to conclude that most citizens would have
responded to the situation as the victim did.
D. The Aggressor's Right of Self-Defense
Like the common law, Washington confers on the aggressor
a qualified right to use force in his own self-defense.7 To enjoy
this right, however, an aggressor must in good faith abandon the
conflict, endeavor in good faith to withdraw from it, and attempt
to communicate his withdrawal to the victim. If these require-
ments are met, an aggressor who initiated a conflict with
nondeadly force may subsequently be privileged to use
nondeadly force if the victim persists in continuing the con-
flict.78 Presumably, the same result would obtain even if the
aggressor used deadly force initially. The rationale of conferring
the limited right of self-defense on an aggressor who withdraws
is probably derived from the concept of necessity. Once the
aggressor has withdrawn, or attempted to, the necessity which
justified the victim's use of force ceases to exist. 4
An aggressor who initiated a conflict with nondeadly force
also would have under the common law, 5 and presumably under
Washington law,7 6 a privilege to use deadly force if his victim
responded unlawfully with deadly force. Assumedly, the scales of
justice weighing the respective interests shift suddenly in the
aggressor's favor because of the unlawful (i.e., non-proportional)
response of the victim which threatens a more important inter-
est, the life of the aggressor, than the interest initially
threatened.
E. Allocation of the Burden of Proof
There continues to be controversy over whether the state
72. State v. Currie, 74 Wash. 2d 197, 443 P.2d 808 (1968); State v. Rummelhoff, 1
Wash. App. 192, 459 P.2d 976 (1969).
73. It should be noted that if the changes in the law of self-defense proposed herein
were adopted, an aggressor who uses nondeadly force against an innocent victim and is
met with deadly force could not in turn respond with deadly force. Thus, he may be
limited to retreat.
74. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
75. See W. LA FAVE & A. ScoT, HANDBOOK ON CIMINAL LAW 395 (1972); R. PER-
KINS, CRIMINAL LAW 998 (2d ed. 1969).
76. There is no reported Washington case involving this situation. See supra note
75. But see supra note 73.
[Vol. 6:237
Self-Defense and Deadly Force
must bear the burden of proof and establish beyond a reasona-
ble doubt the absence of self-defense or whether the defendant
may be required to establish the defense by a preponderance of
the evidence.7 The controversy arises both as a matter of fed-
eral constitutional law7 8 and as a matter of state statutory inter-
pretation.7 9 The question also has important implications for the
theory of substantive criminal law.
At early common law self-defense was considered an affirm-
ative defense which the defendant had to establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.80 This scheme reflected the "negativist"
theory of criminal law which held that a person who intention-
ally caused harm to another was guilty unless he could bring
himself within a recognized exception to the rule prohibiting this
type of behavior. 8' Thus, the state had to prove as material ele-
ments of its case in chief that the defendant intentionally killed
another human being or caused him harm. If those facts were
established, the defendant would then have to bear the burden
of persuading the jury that he had acted in self-defense. Such a
claim by the defendant was in effect an exculpatory explanation
of his behavior: what is normally considered a crime, killing
another human being or causing injury, was under the special
circumstances of his case an appropriate and, therefore, lawful
act. 2 The common law allocated this burden of persuasion to
defendants who claimed self-defense in part because, based on
common human experience, it presumed that such behavior was
77. See infra notes 78-79.
78. See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197 (1977); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
79. See State v. McCullum, 98 Wash. 2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983); State v. Hanton,
94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980); State v. Roberts, 88
Wash. 2d 337, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977); State v. Willians, 27 Wash. App. 848, 621 P.2d 176
(1980); State v. Bradley, 20 Wash. App. 340, 581 P.2d 1053 (1978).
80. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 117 (1977), in which Justice White said:
In determining whether New York's allocation to the defendant of proving
the mitigating circumstances of severe emotional disturbance is consistent with
due process, it is therefore relevant to note that this defense is a considerably
expanded version of the common-law defense of heat of passion on sudden
provocation and that at common law [sic] the burden of proving the latter, as
well as other alfirmative defenses-indeed, "all ... circumstances of justifica-
tion, excuse or alleviation"-rested on the defendant.
Id. at 202 (citations omitted). See also 3 J. S'rax'N, A HisToRy oF Tm CRMINAL LAw OF
ENGLAN 36 (1883).
81. See H. PAcKm, Tz Lnmrrs oF Tm CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 105-07 (1968).
82. Id.
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in most cases unlawful." Also, defendants were considered to
have better access to any evidence which would demonstrate
why it was not unlawful under the particular circumstances.s4
The allocation of burdens of proof reflects several important
concerns in the criminal law. Of paramount importance is the
role the burden of proof plays in preserving our accusatorial sys-
tem of justice.85 Requiring the state to prove all material ele-
ments of a crime insures that the defendant will be entitled to
exercise his fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself.86
Any human factfinding endeavor is capable of error. The
formulation and allocation of burdens are also designed to
insure that, if some mistakes are inevitable, they will probably
be consistent with whatever policy goals the legislature or court
deem paramount. Allocating the burden of persuasion in cases of
self-defense to criminal defendants reflects the social policy
objective that, in close cases, any uncertainty in factfinding
involving persons who cause intentional harm to others should
be resolved in favor of criminal responsibility.8 7 Thus, error (or,
more precisely resolving uncertainty in close cases) is resolved
against this class of defendants.
Resolving close cases against criminal defendants is also
perceived as reflecting serious concern about the possibility of
feigning by criminal defendants. Making claims of self-defense
more difficult to sustain can be seen as exercising a form of gen-
eral deterrence, dissuading those who might wrongfully inflict
intentional harm on others and then hope to avoid criminal
responsibility by falsely claiming the right to use force in self-
defense.8'
In addition to influencing outcomes in particular cases, the
allocations of the burden of proof have serious theoretical impli-
cations. If self-defense is seen as justified behavior which citi-
83. Id.
84. People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 306, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909, 383 N.Y.S.2d 573,
583 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring).
85. An accusatorial system of justice requires the police to gather evidence against
an accused without requiring the accused to give testimonial evidence himself. See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
86. The fifth amendment assures that "no person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Requiring a
criminal defendant to explain why he acted as he did could undermine the privilege
against self-incrimination.
87. See People v. Patterson, 39 N.Y.2d 288, 305-07, 347 N.E.2d 898, 909-10, 383
N.Y.S.2d 573, 583-85 (1976) (Breitel, C.J., concurring).
88. See supra note 41.
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zens are entitled to engage in, and if self-defense is perceived
either as the choice of lesser evils or as the vindication of per-
sonal autonomy and security, then the defendant's act is the
appropriate and desirable social response under the circum-
stances. Arguably, then, the state ought to bear the burden of
proof in negating a claim of self-defense since the intentional
causation of harm to another under these circumstances is not
only lawful but desired social behavior.8 9
If, on the other hand, self-defense is grounded in the doc-
trine of duress, then arguably it is a claim that the individual
defendant lacked a true choice and should not be considered
personally responsible.90 Since such a claim clearly focuses more
on the will of the defendant than on the conduct he engaged
in," a good case can be made that defendants should be
required to carry the burden of proof.
Of course, procedural concerns, such as error and feigning,
may be in conflict with substantive theory. Absent constitutional
limitations,92 the legislature is free to override the logic of sub-
stantive theory by insuring that its procedural concerns are
solved by appropriate procedural devices such as burdens of
proof.
The United States Supreme Court has recently confronted
analogous issues. In the recent cases of Mullaney v. Wilbur 3
and Patterson v. New York," the Court grappled with the
proper-allocation of the burden of proof in state prosecutions for
homicide. In Mullaney,98 the Court held that the state could not
dispense with its constitutional burden of proving all elements
of a crime by conclusively presuming that one element had been
established once it had proven a different element. Nor could it
require a defendant in a criminal prosecution to establish the
nonexistence of any statutory element.96 In Patterson,97 the
Court concluded that the state could require the defendant to
bear the burden of proof of an affirmative defense, provided the
state clearly denominated it as such in its statutory scheme. In
89. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
90. Id.
91. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
93. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
94. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
95. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
96. Id. at 686-87, 703-04.
97. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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addition, the Court noted that the defense provided by New
York's statutory scheme was more favorable to the defendant
than previously available defenses."8 At the moment there is no
Supreme Court case which explicitly requires the state to dis-
prove the traditional common law claim of self-defense.9
In the 1977 case of State v. Roberts00 the Washington
Supreme Court held that the state had'to disprove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt the existence of self-defense once the defendant
had introduced some evidence tending to establish the claim.
The court essentially concluded that the state homicide statute
in effect at that time specified that the absence of either "justifi-
cation or excuse" was a material element set forth on the face of
the homicide statute.10' Thus, under Mullaney,0 2 the state had
to negate all "elements" of the crime including the possible
"facts" of self-defense which, if present, would have constituted
"justification."
Since the Roberts case, the Washington legislature has
changed the homicide statute.108 The words "without justifica-
98. Id. at 202-09. It is not clear, however, whether this fact was essential to the
Court's holding.
99. Critics of the Patterson case maintain that the analysis used by the majority
simply requires state legislatures to draft criminal statutes with care and precision. They
claim that state legislatures are free to allocate to criminal defendants the burden of
proof in establishing the claim of self-defense provided the statute clearly labels self-
defense as an affirmative defense and that it does not draw any inference concerning the
presence or absence of other enumerated material elements. See, e.g., Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S 197, 221-23 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
100. 88 Wash. 2d 337, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977).
101. Id. at 343-44, 562 P.2d at 1262.
102. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
103. In enacting WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9A.32.030, .050 (1981), the legislature had
deleted the words "unless it [killing another human being] is excusable or justifiable,"
definitional terms which arguably cast on the prosecution the burden of proving the
absence of self-defense. See State v. Takacs, 31 Wash. App. 868, 645 P.2d 1109 (1982).
Section 9A.32.030 currently defines first degree murder as follows:
Murder in the first degree. (1)A person is guilty of murder in the first
degree when:
(a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he
causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
(b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human
life, he engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person,
and thereby causes the death of a person; or
(c) He commits or attempts to commit the crime of either (1) robbery, in
the first or second degree, (2) rape in the first or second dedgree, (3) burglary
in the first degree, (4) arson in the first degree, or (5) kidnaping in the first or
second degree, and; in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or in
immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, causes the death of a
person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under
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tion or excuse" have been deleted. This statutory revision raised
the interesting question of whether the state still must disprove
the claim of self-defense or whether defendants can now be
required to establish the defense as required under common law.
Currently, Washington courts are wrestling with this ques-
tion. 04 In several recent cases, the courts have demonstrated
their own confusion and are making serious mistakes in their
analyses of the problem.
In State v. Hanton,'0 5 the Washington Supreme Court con-
fronted the question of whether the defendant would be
required to carry the burden of establishing self-defense in a
prosecution for manslaughter in the first degree. The trial court
rejected a requested defense instruction which would have
explicitly imposed on the state the burden of proving the
absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it
gave a* jury instruction effectively casting on the defendant the
burden of establishing self-defense.10 8
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the conviction
concluding that, in a prosecution for first-degree manslaughter,
this subdivision (1)(c) in which the defendant was not the only participant in
the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of
the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant:
(i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, com-
mand, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and
(ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or
substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and
(iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and
(iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant
intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical
injury.
(2) Murder in the first degree is a class A felony.
WASH. RE v. CODE § 9A.32.030 (1981).
104. See, e.g., State v. McCullum, 98 Wash. 2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983); State v.
Hanton, 94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980); State v.
Takacs, 31 Wash. App. 868, 645 P.2d 1109 (1982); State v. Williams, 27 Wash. App. 848,
621 P.2d 176 (1980); State v. Bradley, 20 Wash. App. 340, 581 P.2d 1053 (1978).
105. 94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
106. The trial court gave the following instruction:
When a defendant claims he killed another in defense of his person or prop-
erty, the burden is upon that defendant only to produce some evidence tending
to prove that the homicide was done in self-defense. It is not necessary for the
defendant to prove this to you beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. The defendant sustains this burden of proof, if from a
consideration of the evidence in the case you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether or not the killing was done in self-defense.
Id. at 131, 614 P.2d at 1281.
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the state has the burden of negating a claim of self-defense (pre-
sumably beyond a reasonable doubt).0 7 The basic structure of
the court's analysis was to focus exclusively on the elements of
the specific crime charged to ascertain what mental state ele-
ment the statute required the prosecution to establish. The first-
degree manslaughter statute required the state to prove that the
defendant "recklessly caused the death of another human
being. ' 10 8 "Recklessly" was further defined by statute as occur-
ring when a person "knows of and disregards a substantial risk
that a wrongful act may occur. ' ' 09 The court concluded that
self-defense was not a "wrongful act" within the meaning of this
statutory definition and that a claim of self-defense was, there-
fore, inconsistent with the element of "recklessness." Conse-
quently, it determined that the state would have to bear the
burden of negating such a claim.
In an extraordinary leap of logic, however, the court also
concluded that no instruction allocating the burden of establish-
ing or negating the claim of self-defense to either party had to
be given since the government had the ultimate burden of estab-
lishing that the defendant's act was "reckless." ' 0 The court
decided that a jury would comprehend that the instruction
requiring the government to establish that the defendant acted
"recklessly" would also effectively inform the jury that it should
resolve any uncertainty concerning the presence or absence of
self-defense against the government.
107. Id. at 131-34, 614 P.2d at 1281-83.
108. The relevant statutory provision is:
Manslaughter in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of manslaughter
in the first degree when:
(a) He recklessly causes the death of another person; or
(b) He intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting
any injury upon the mother of such child.
(2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060 (1981).
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.08.020 (1981) (emphasis added). That section, which
provides general definitions of culpability or mens rea, defines "recklessness" as follows:
"(c) Reckless: A person is reckless or acts recklessly when he knows of and
disregards a substantial risk that a wrongful act may occur and his disregard of
such substantial risk is a gross deviation from the standard of care that a rea-
sonable man would exercise in the same situation." Id. (emphasis added).
110. 94 Wash. 2d 129, 134, 614 P.2d 1280, 1282 (1980). The court, without explicitly
stating the proposition, must have concluded that a general instruction requiring the
state to prove each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt adequately
instructed the jury how to resolve any doubt concerning the presence or absence of
claimed self-defense.
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Frankly, if the court was confident that its analysis was cor-
rect (i.e., that a claim of self-defense was logically inconsistent
with acting recklessly), it should have required the trial court to
give an instruction which would make clear to the finders of fact
the logic of their factfinding task. If self-defense is logically
inconsistent with a reckless act, and if the government must
establish that the defendant acted "recklessly," an instruction
requiring the prosecution to negate a claim of self-defense
beyond a reasonable doubt should be given to insure that the
jury fully comprehends its difficult task. Failure to do so may
well give the government the benefit of implied linkage or pre-
sumption of elements or of an improperly allocated burden of
persuasion."' These are precisely the shortcomings criticized by
the United States Supreme Court in Mullaney.11 2
A more fundamental question, however, is whether the
court was essentially correct in its analysis. To be sure, the
court's analysis was not without some support, given the Wash-
ington statute defining "recklessness." The intriguing inquiry is
whether the legislature truly intended to pack into the statutory
definition of "recklessly" either the common law defense of self-
defense or the broader common law defense of mistake of law.113
For this was essentially what the court concluded. The court
seemingly has decided that not only must the defendant have
been reckless as to whether his action might cause harm,1 4 but
he also must have acted disregarding the risk that his act might
also be "wrongful." It is very unlikely that the legislature
intended to impose on the government the burden of establish-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt, in every case in which a defen-
dant recklessly kills or harms another human being, that he
acted with conscious awareness of the risk that he might be
committing a "wrongful act." Such an interpretation, in effect,
111. See supra note 95. But see infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
112. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
113. A "mistake of law" arises generally when an individual believes that his con-
duct is not proscribed by the criminal law. See generally W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, HAND-
BOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 362-69 (1972). Such a belief by an individual is usually not rele-
vant to an assessment of criminal responsibility. For an excellent analysis of the problem
see United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975)
(Bazelon, J., concurring).
114. The Model Penal Code defines an actor as acting "recklessly" in similar situa-
tions if "he consciously disregards a substantial risk that the material element exists or
will result from his conduct, "in this case the death of a human being." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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requires the state to establish that each defendant acted with
awareness that he might be breaking the law. Surely, the maxim
that everyone is presumed to know the law is still valid in this
state and generally under the common law. 1 5
There is absolutely no indication that the legislature
intended to change the fundamental architecture of the homi-
cide statute from a "descriptive" theory" of criminal law to a
"normative" theory.17 Such a change could require the state to
prove in all homicide prosecutions (except for second-degree
manslaughter) that the defendant acted with actual awareness
that his conduct might be against the law. If the court's analysis
is correct, will any justificatory claim (such as necessity) or any
exculpatory claim (such as mistake of fact or of law) suffice to
cast on the government the burden of disproving the claim?" 8
Moreover, the net result of the opinion is to dispense with
the requirement that the defendant have a reasonable belief that
the elements of self-defense are met." 9 The court would permit
115. See W. LA FAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 356-69 (1972).
116. A descriptive theory describes similarities in statutes but draws no inferences
other than the fact that the similarities exist. Consequently, a descriptive theory does
not serve as a basis for further legislation because it does not infer any principles from
existing laws. Descriptive theorists strive to minimize the normative content of the crimi-
nal law in order to render it "precise and free from the passions of subjective moral
judgment." Consequently, descriptive rules specify proscribed behavior in rather simple,
straightforward terms that do not invite subjective assessments of moral blameworthi-
ness. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 396-401 (1978).
117. A normative theory infers from similarities in statutes the standards of conduct
that are present in communities. Thus, a normative theory serves as a basis for future
legislation because it infers principles from existing laws. Normative theorists seek to
keep the language of the criminal law "close to the daily problems of assessment and
blame that infuse the criminal process." Consequently, normative rules specify pro-
scribed behavior in value-laden terms that invite subjective assessments of moral blame-
worthiness. See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAw 396-401 (1978).
118. In State v. Hanton, 94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035
(1980), the defendant's claim was self-defense and the court concluded that such a claim
was inconsistent with acting in disregard "of a substantial risk that a wrongful act may
occur .... " Id. at 133, 614 P.2d at 1282. But the variety of explanations offered by
future defendants may not be so limited. One could easily imagine justificatory claims
like "national security," see United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208 (D.C. Cir. 1975), or
defense of property against trespass. See State v. Griffith, 91 Wash. 2d 572, 589 P.2d 799
(1979). In effect, a claim by the defendant that he honestly believed his conduct to be
"lawful," and thus not "wrongful," would establish that he was not acting "recklessly."
Under the court's analysis, the government would have to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not believe that his reasons for acting made his conduct
lawful.
119. Assumedly, in Hanton, if the jury finds that the defendant honestly but unrea-
sonably believed in the need to take human life in self-defense, it should not convict the
defendant of first-degree manslaughter because such honest belief is inconsistent with
1983] Self-Defense and Deadly Force
a defendant to intentionally inflict harm on another and cause
death even though his behavior did not measure up to the com-
munity standard.2 0 If the court's analysis is correct, and the
statutory scheme of self-defense set forth in sections
9A.16.050(1) and (2) of the Washington Code in fact accurately
states the law of self-defense, then other cases decided since
Hanton may have been incorrectly decided.'"
What is more troubling, however, is that the court's decision
effectively created a strong possibility that Washington will rec-
ognize the defense of "imperfect self-defense," a reductive
defense not previously permitted.' A defendant who honestly
but unreasonably believes he is entitled to take human life in
self-defense cannot be convicted of first-degree manslaughter.12
The court in Hanton did not consider whether the prosecu-
tion had to carry the burden of proof in negating a claim of self-
defense in a prosecution for first- or second-degree mur-
der.'2 However, the question did arise three years later. In State
recklessness or conscious awareness of the risk that self-defense might not be necessary.
120. The Model Penal Code may support the approach taken by the court in
Hanton. The Code simply treats the actor's belief in the necessity of self-defense as a
material element which must be assessed in light of the degree of culpability specified in
the statute. Thus, the Code suggests that an actor cannot be convicted of reckless homi-
cide even if he intentionally takes human life unless he was reckless in deciding that the
use of deadly force in self-defense was necessary. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 com-
ment at 131-32 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1955). The Code approach has had very little impact
on state criminal legislation. See Note, Justification: The Impact of the Model Penal
Code on State Law Reform, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 914, 920 (1975).
121. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 95 Wash. 2d 616, 628 P.2d 472 (1981); State v. Castro,
30 Wash. App. 586, 636 P.2d 1099 (1981).
122. See, e.g., State v. Painter, 27 Wash. App. 708, 620 P,2d 1001 (1980).
123. See supra note 119. The proper charge would probably be manslaughter in the
second degree since that crime simply requires the government to prove that the defen-
dant acted negligently.
124. For the text of the first-degree murder statute see supra note 103. The statu-
tory definition of second-degree murder is as follows:
Murder in the second degree. (1) A person is guilty of murder in the sec-
ond degree when:
(a) With intent to cause the death of another person but without premedita-
tion, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or
(b) He commits or attempts to commit any felony other than those enumer-
ated in RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), and, in the course of and in furtherance of such
crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, causes the
death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prose-
cution under this subdivision (1)(b) in which the defendant was not the only
participant in the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant
(i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command,
importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and
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v. McCullum, 25 the court held that, under the current criminal
code of Washington, the state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt the absence of self-defense in a prosecution for first
degree murder. 126 The court's analysis was somewhat more com-
plicated than the analysis it used in Hanton.12 7 In McCullum it
concluded that the fourteenth amendment as interpreted in the
recent United States Supreme Court cases of Mullaney 28 and
Patterson12 9 required the prosecution to prove every element of
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. It then determined that the
legislature, in revising the definition of first degree murder, had
not intended to delete the absence of self-defense (i.e., without
justification) as an element of the state's case. 130 Therefore, the
court decided that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required the prosecution to prove every statutory
element of the crime of first degree murder, including the
absence of self-defense.
Truly amazing is the court's conclusion that the legislature
did not intend to classify self-defense as an affirmative defense
as opposed to an element of the crime when it deleted the speci-
fied clause"3 1 from the definitional part of the homicide statute
and placed the self-defense provision in the statutory section
entitled "Defenses." It seems that nothing short of a specific
statutory revision labelling self-defense as an affirmative defense
(ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or sub-
stance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and
(iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was
armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and
(iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant intended
to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.
(2) Murder in the second degree is a class A felony.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.050 (1981).
125. 98 Wash. 2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983).
126. Id. at 494, 656 P.2d at 1071.
127. See supra notes 108-23 and accompanying text.
128. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
129. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
130. The court said:
By removing the words "unless it is excusable or justifiable" from the defini-
tion of homicide and including self-defense under the provisions of RCWA
9A.16, entitled "Defenses", the Legislature merely relieved the State of the
time-consuming and unnecessary task of alleging and proving negative proposi-
tions which may not be involved in each case. Once the issue of self-defense is
properly raised, however, the absence of self-defense becomes another element
of the offense which the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
98 Wash. 2d 484, 493-94, 656 P.2d 1064, 1070 (1983).
131. Id.
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which the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence will manifest legislative intent with sufficient strength
and clarity.
Not content with ignoring the more likely inference of legis-
lative intent based on the revision of the criminal code, the court
attempted to bolster its decision by parsing the language of the
first degree murder statute in the same manner as it had parsed
the first degree manslaughter statute in Hanton.132 It deter-
mined, correctly, that "intent to cause the death of another per-
son" is an element of first degree murder under Washington
law.' 3 The court then examined the concept of "intent" as set
forth in the general definitional terms of the criminal code.'"
Quoting the statute, the court said a person acts with "intent"
when "he acts with the objective or purpose to accomplish a
result which constitutes a crime" (emphasis in the original).' 35
Since killing in self-defense is explicitly made "justifiable" under
Title 9A, section 16.050 of the Washington Code, a person can-
not be acting with the "intent" required by the same title in
section 08.010(1)(a).' 6 This is so, evidently, even though the sec-
tion governing self-defense is contained in the section captioned
as "Defenses."
Again, the court, as it did in Hanton,137 comes perilously
close to torturing language in a literal, mechanical, and selective
fashion to ascertain legislative intent. The court intimates in its
opinion that an individual cannot act with the requisite criminal
intent unless he intends to act unlawfully. Mirabile dictu, the
court may well have imported into a rather straightforward,
132. 94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980). See supra
notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
133. 98 Wash. 2d 484, 495, 656 P.2d 1064, 1071 (1983). It should be noted that
"intent to cause the death of another person" is also an element of intentional homicide
in second degree murder. See supra note 124. Thus, the holding in McCullum will prob-
ably require the prosecution to negate a claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt
in a prosecution for second-degree murder.
134. This is essentially the same approach the court took in Hanton when it parsed
the meaning of "recklessly." See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
135. 98 Wash. 2d 484, 495, 656 P.2d 1064, 1071 (1983). The court also examined
WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.030(1) (1981); 98 Wash. 2d 484, 495, 656 P.2d 1064, 1071
(1983); see also State v. Hanton, 94 Wash. 2d 129, 131-32, 614 P.2d 1280, 1282, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
136. WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.16.050 (1981); § 9A.08.010(1)(A). Thus, the court inti-
mates that in order to convict a defendant of first degree murder the prosecution must
prove not only that a person intentionally killed another human being, but that he did so
intending that it be an unlawful killing, i.e., without justification or excuse.
137. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text.
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descriptive first degree murder statute a requirement that the
government establish that a defendant acted with the purpose of
committing a crime.
However, it is clearly not a requirement for criminal respon-
sibility that a person must act with the intent to commit a
crime. The specific language of the murder statute simply
requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant "intended
to cause the death of another person" together with the other
elements not at issue here. A general definitional term of
"intent" ought not to convert the mens rea requirement, speci-
fied in the murder statute itself, into the more demanding
requirement that the prosecution establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that every deliberate killing of another human being is
also unlawful or constitutes a crime. 38 Nor does characterizing a
killing in self-defense as "lawful" necessarily resolve which party
should bear the burden of proof as to the presence or absence of
self-defense. 3 9 It simply describes the legal consequence once a
particular fact (or set of facts) has been determined. Moreover,
as at common law, 40 deliberately taking the life of another
human being is presumptively proscribed unless the defendant
can explain why the killing is within a recognized exception to
the general proscriptive rule against taking human life
intentionally.
In McCullum,'" the court did not consider whether the
defense of "imperfect self-defense' 42 would now become availa-
ble to defendants charged with first or second degree murder. It
seems unlikely that this defense should be permitted since the
statutory definition of "intent" (unlike the statutory definition
138. There is no evidence that the legislature, in revising the criminal code,
intended to shift from a descriptive theory of criminal law to a normative theory. See
supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text. Moreover, the statutory language defining
"intent" in the first and second degree murder statutes is far less capable of sustaining
within its meaning additional normative content such as "awareness of wrongdoing"
than is the statutory language defining manslaughter in the first degree. See supra notes
113-15 and accompanying text. The linguistic analysis used by the court utterly fails to
convince the careful reader that the legislature intended to pack into the concept of
"intent" the general concepts of "lawful" or "justified" conduct or the specific legal doc-
trine of self-defense.
139. Even the court tacitly recognized this in its opinion in McCullum by noting
that the criminal code requires defendants to bear the burden of certain defenses as to
certain crimes or to rebut certain inferences. State v. McCullum, 98 Wash. 2d 484, 492-
93, 656 P.2d 1064, 1070 (1983).
140. See supra notes 34-58 and accompanying text.
141. 98 Wash. 2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983).
142. See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
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of "recklessly" as interpreted in Hanton"13 ) does not refer to the
defendant's belief about the "wrongfulness" of his conduct. 44 It
would be anomalous to permit imperfect self-defense to be avail-
able in a prosecution for first degree manslaughter but not in a
prosecution for first or second degree murder. Nonetheless, it
seems very unlikely that it would be available to defendants
charged with either first or second degree murder. If this is the
case, then prosecutors need only charge first or second degree
murder in order to avoid the defense of imperfect self-defense.
Having decided that the state must prove the absence of
self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt, the court had the cour-
age of its conviction sufficient to require that a specific jury
instruction to this effect should be given. It modified State v.
Hanton"5 and other cases"" which had not required a specific
jury instruction allocating to the prosecution the burden of
negating a claim of self-defense, so long as the instructions had
permitted defense counsel to argue that theory.
It should be noted, however, that at its core, McCullum is a
case that turns solely on legislative intent. Despite the constitu-
tional analysis contained in the opinion, it seems almost certain
that the opinion does not preclude the legislature from treating
self-defense as an affirmative defense and allocating the burden
of persuasion to the defendant, provided such legislative intent
is made manifestly clear."" The constitutional problems noted
by the court arose only after the court concluded the legislature
intended to make the absence of self-defense an element of
homicide and that the definitional terms of homicide necessarily
incorporated the absence of self-defense as an element.
As it did in Hanton,"I the court took the most narrow ana-
lytical approach available. It focused exclusively on the specific
statute defining the offense charged, and its parsing of the ele-
ments contained in the statute determined the allocation of the
burden of proof in a claim of self-defense. There was no attempt
143. 94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
144. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
145. 94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
146. State v. Savage, 94 Wash. 2d 569, 618 P.2d 82 (1980); State v. Burt, 94 Wash.
2d 108, 614 P.2d 654 (1980); State v. King, 92 Wash. 2d 541, 599 P.2d 522 (1979).
147. The court in McCullum said: "Since the Legislature has not clearly imposed
the burden of proving self-defense on criminal defendants, we conclude the obligation to
prove the absence of self-defense remains at all times with the prosecution." 98 Wash. 2d
484, 494, 656 P.2d 1064, 1071 (1983).
148. 94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
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in the majority opinion to consider self-defense as an integrated
common law doctrine, analyzing the issues in a comprehensive
and cohesive manner in light of the substantive policies " e and
procedural concerns'"0 underlying the doctrine. Certainly, the
Supreme Court did not intend, as it made clear in Patterson,"1
to impose doctrinal straight-jackets on state legislatures as they
confront difficult policy choices in criminal law nor to reduce
state supreme courts to the exclusive role of technicians charged
with construing criminal codes.
The court's decisions in State v. Hanton 51 and State v.
McCullumM6 are at best plausible results and, at worst, illogical
and incorrect results. It is not clear that Mullaney required the
results reached in these cases since in fact neither the elements
of first-degree murder nor the elements of first-degree man-
slaughter refer explicitly to self-defense. Nor is there on the face
of the statute impermissible linkage or presumptive findings of
material elements. The court would have been better off
addressing the issue by analyzing either the general intent of the
legislature in revising the murder and manslaughter statutes or,
preferably, by examining the common law of self-defense as an
integrated defense applicable to all homicide charges.
Indeed, the court's analysis may well lead to selective and
different outcomes in the allocation of burdens dependent on
the crime charged when self-defense is raised. This result can be
seen in State v. Takacs.1 54 In that case the court, using the
architectonic analysis set forth in Hanton, concluded that the
claim of self-defense was not logically inconsistent with the
mental state required for assault in the second degree (namely,
"knowledge" and "intent") and, accordingly, the state did not
have to bear the burden of proof in negating a claim of self-
defense.1 5
The Washington Supreme Court, in trying too hard to
thread its way through Mullaney,156 Patterson,1 57 and Sand-
149. See supra notes 7-33 & 89-91 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
151. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
152. 94 Wash. 2d 129, 614 P.2d 1280, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1035 (1980).
153. 98 Wash. 2d 484, 656 P.2d 1064 (1983).
154. 31 Wash. App. 868, 645 P.2d 409 (1982).
155. This decision may no longer be correct in light of McCullum.
156. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
157. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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strom,158 took the narrowest path available. Unfortunately, it is
a path that may branch quickly into myriad directions depend-
ing on the mental states contained in the particular crime
charged. It would then have been far preferable had the court
treated the claim of self-defense as an integrated common law
doctrine, analyzing the issue in a comprehensive and cohesive
manner in light of the policies underlying the right of self-
defense.5 9
V. SOME "HARD CASES" OF SELF-DEFENSE
As noted earlier' 60 the current law governing the right of
self-defense may be under tremendous pressure to change. Vio-
lent crimes are increasing, and the public's fear of crime is pro-
nounced."" Washington courts have recently encountered claims
of self-defense that illustrate this tension. Unfortunately, the
courts are simply not resolving them in a satisfactory manner.
Perhaps the most celebrated Washington case involving the
claim of self-defense is that of State v. Wanrow.6 2 The defen-
dant was convicted of second-degree murder and first-degree
assault despite her claim of self-defense. The defendant was a 5'
4" female who at the time of her alleged confrontation with a
violent aggressor had a broken leg and was using a crutch. Using
a pistol, she shot and killed her alleged assailant, a large man
who was visibly intoxicated, while in the home of her friend. The
defendant claimed that she felt threatened with great bodily
harm, and consequently, her use of deadly force in self-defense
was justified.
The trial court instructed the jury that the defendant could
kill in self-defense if she honestly and reasonably believed,
based on facts or circumstances immediately preceding her use
of deadly force, that the victim intended to kill her or inflict
great bodily harm on her. 6 3 The jury convicted Wanrow despite
her claim of self-defense.
The Washington Supreme Court reversed Wanrow's convic-
tion on several grounds, including the improper instructions by
the trial court on self-defense. According to the court, the
158. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
159. See supra notes 7-33 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
161. See supra noteg 2-3.
162. 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
163. Id. at 234, 559 P.2d at 555.
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instructions were erroneous because they limited the basis on
which the victim feared harm to those facts and circumstances
occurring "immediately prior to or during" the violent confron-
tation. 4 More significantly, the court criticized the trial court's
use of masculine pronouns in the jury instructions. The court
determined that gender specific pronouns contained in the
instructions required the jury to measure the reasonableness of
the defendant's recourse to force by considering what a- reasona-
ble male might do under the circumstances.1 6 5
Unfortunately, the majority opinion was not satisfied with
insuring that the law acknowledge the differential physical char-
acteristics of males and females by taking them into account in
the formulation of the objective standard. In further analysis,
which can only be described as obtuse and even incomprehensi-
ble, the court suggested that the jury should only determine if
this particular defendant actually feared death or serious bodily
harm at the hands of her purported aggressor, even if her fear
was unreasonable.'" As indicated earlier,16 7 the common law has
always insisted that the use of force in self-defense be reasona-
ble, that is, that the perception the defendant has of the threat
which confronts him or her must coincide with what the so-
called reasonable person as the representative of society would
perceive under the same circumstances. Thus, Wanrow can only
be read intelligently (and perhaps in a corrective fashion), as
permitting the jury to invest the reasonable person with the
same characteristic of gender as the defendant. In subsequent
cases Washington courts have indicated that this is what the
court really meant in Wanrow. s8
The tragedy of the Wanrow case is the Washington
Supreme Court's failure to confront the basic unfairness whicA
164. Id. at 234-36, 559 P.2d at 555-56.
165. Id. at 239-41, 559 P.2d at 558-59.
166. The court stated that "the defendant's actions are to be judged against her own
subjective impressions and not those which a detached jury might determine to be objec-
tively reasonable." 88 Wash. 2d 221, 240, 559 P.2d 548, 558 (1977). The defendant may
also have argued in the alternative that she shot the victim reflexively when he surprised
her. Arguably, this claim is very similar to that put forth by the defendant in State v.
Adams, 32 Wash. App. 393, 641 P.2d 1207 (1982). See infra note 167 and accompanying
text.
167. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., State v. Penn, 89 Wash. 2d 63, 568 P.2d 797 (1977). However, in other
cases courts have seemingly been influenced by this aspect of the Wanrow decision. Cf.
Cook v. Gisler, 20 Wash. App. 677, 582 P.2d 550 (1978) (jury must view the circum-
stances as they reasonably might have appeared to the defendant at that time).
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the current law of self-defense imposes on most females and on
many other victims of violence. Under the current law, 69 it may
be possible to take into account the characteristics of a defen-
dant (such as gender, size, or injury) in deciding what type of
harm the victim reasonably feared. But so long as the law insists
that a victim, however weak or otherwise physically disadvan-
taged, respond to the threat of nondeadly force (and the pre-
sumed harm of only a battery) with nondeadly force, these vic-
tims will in the vast majority of cases, be condemned to suffer a
beating without hope of any effective right of self-defense. Their
sole recourse is the contingent remedy of public arrest and pros-
ecution at a later date.'70 In other words, the right to respond
only with force which is proportional to the force threatened is
an illusory right for many victims. The law in practice denies
them any effective right of self-defense.
The facts of the Wanrow case pose the dilemma poign-
antly. 17' Yvonne Wanrow was not confronted with deadly force
by her aggressor. Therefore, it is submitted that it would be very
unlikely for any jury to conclude that she reasonably feared
death or great bodily harm at his hands.'7 2 Thus, under common
law doctrine as traditionally applied by Washington courts,
Wanrow was virtually condemned to lose in her confrontation
with violence unless she could use deadly force-the only force
which could compensate for her extreme physical limitations.
This violent confrontation was a classic case of a proportional
response insuring an ineffective response.
In a more recent Washington case, State v. Adams,'7 3 the
court of appeals reversed a conviction for second-degree man-
slaughter and remanded the case with instructions that the
defendant should be permitted to place his theory of self-
defense before the jury even though it was virtually certain
169. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; infra note 172.
170. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
172. Since the definition of deadly force focuses on either the intent of its user or
the probable result of its use, counsel for defendants such as Ms. Wanrow can always
argue to the jury that the defendant reasonably feared death or great bodily harm even if
the aggressor was not armed with a deadly weapon or instrument or did not verbally
threaten such harm. Such an argument may be difficult to carry successfully since the
objective facts (other than perhaps the disparity in size or past experience of the partici-
pants) are not likely to persuade a jury that the defendant reasonably feared death or
great bodily harm. See supra notes 47-48; supra note 57 and accompanying text.
173. 31 Wash. App. 393, 641 P.2d 1207 (1982).
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(despite the appellate court's conclusion to the contrary) that
the requisite elements of self-defense were not present. In this
rather bizarre case, the defendant was nearby while two burglars
were breaking into and entering a trailer which belonged to a
neighbor who lived next door to the defendant. Apparently the
burglars, one of whom was carrying a loaded shotgun stolen from
the trailer, were not aware of the defendant's presence. Accord-
ing to the defendant's testimony, he was "very scared . .. in
fear of my life" and he unintentionally fired a single round
which struck the victim in the back, killing the burglar who was
carrying the weapon.1" 4
The trial court had refused to give a self-defense instruction
despite defendant's request because, in its opinion, "there is no
evidence whatever of any assault or intended assault or
attempted assault on his person. ' 175 Essentially, the trial court
had determined that no reasonable person in the defendant's
situation would have believed he was threatened with imminent
death or great bodily harm. The appellate court disagreed and
decided that there was sufficient evidence for the defendant to
place this defense before the jury for its determination.
Based on the facts presented in the appellate court opinion,
this conclusion is rather extraordinary. The defendant evidently
did not indicate in his testimony that the victim or his compan-
ion even knew of his presence or that he believed the burglars
knew of his presence. Nor did he set forth any facts which indi-
cated that the aggressor, though armed with deadly force,
intended to use it against the defendant or anyone else. 176
What is even more startling, and is not even discussed by
the appellate court, is the defendant's own testimony that he
fired his weapon unintentionally. 77 At its core, the claim of self-
defense is a claim that, under the circumstances as the defen-
dant perceived them, his use of force (deaaly or nondeadly) was
deliberate and appropriate.178 It strains both the credulity of
174. 31 Wash. App. 393, 394, 641 P.2d 1207, 1209 (1982).
175. Id. at 395, 641 P.2d at 1209.
176. There were additional facts which the court relied on in concluding that the
defendant had adduced sufficient evidence to place his claim of self-defense before the
jury. These included: the neighbor whose house was being burglarized had shot at one of
the burglars a week earlier; the incident occurred in a remote area in the evening and
there was no telephone nearby; the defendant did not know where one of the burglars
was at the time of the shooting.
177. Adams, 31 Wash. App. at 394, 641 P.2d at 1209.
178. See supra notes 7-20; supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text. It should be
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factfinders and the theory of self-defense to rest the justification
of self-defense on accident. Put differently, the fundamental
substance of the claim of self-defense is that the defendant
intentionally responded with force to avoid harm or because of
his lack of free will or to preserve his personal zone of secur-
ity. '79 The accidental or unintentional use of deadly force is
inconsistent with any theory of self-defense which must take as
its primary objective the deliberate preservation of life or limb
or security. It is difficult to understand how accidental use of
force promotes or advances those objectives.
There is no doubt that the Adams case posed serious ques-
tions for the appellate court. How imminent or explicit must the
threat of deadly force or serious bodily harm be before the vic-
tim will enjoy the right of self-defense? When a defendant is
confronted by multiple aggressors, is the presence or threatened
use of deadly force a necessary condition for lawful resort to
deadly force by the victim? And, perhaps, most important, given
a state of extreme uncertainty as to the aggressor's intention,
the precise nature of the force threatened and the harm the vic-
tim may suffer, should the law place on innocent victims the
burden of further inquiry to ascertain the "true" state of affairs?
Rather than confront these questions and the more difficult
questions of whether the law governing the use of deadly force
should be changed, the appellate court effectively preserved the
formalism of the present law while deliberately inviting jury nul-
lification of this formal law at another trial.180 A better course
for the court would have been to face these tough questions
forthrightly; instead, it was satisfied with a procedural sidestep.
Rather than confront the difficult question of whether the
law of self-defense in its present form is viable in today's violent
noted that, according to the court, Wanrow testified that she shot her alleged aggressor
"in what amounted to a reflex reaction." 88 Wash. 2d at 226, 559 P.2d at 551. It may be
that a victim can shoot reflexively and still be acting in self-defense. But see Annot., 15
A.L.R. 4th 983 (1982).
179. See supra notes 7-33 and accompanying text.
180. It can be argued that the better method of adjusting to today's increased vio-
lence and the deficiencies of the law of self-defense as criticized in this article is to pre-
serve the current formal content of the law but to encourage jury justice through jury
nullification on the particular facts of each case. This remedial approach would not
require the law of self-defense to be recast in a more expansive fashion. This approach
ignores empirical evidence indicating that juries generally do follow the law as set forth
in jury instructions. See H. KALVEN & H. ZasL, THE AMERICAN JURY 55-56 (1966). It
also sacrifices predictability and even-handedness, qualities generally perceived as desir-
able in the law. See generally L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
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society, Washington courts have chosen to make ad hoc adjust-
ments to specific components in order to soften the impact of
the rules in particular cases. It is time to confront the difficult
question.
VI. A CRITIQUE OF THE LAW GOVERNING THE USE OF DEADLY
FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE
The common law as understood by most courts, including
Washington courts, permits the use of deadly force in self-
defense but rigidly subordinates that right to the overriding,
limiting principle of proportionality. As noted earlier,' the
common law authorizes a victim to respond only with force that
is proportional to the force used by the aggressor even though in
many instances it will clearly be ineffective to protect the victim.
Washington permits a victim to use deadly force only if he is
threatened with death or great bodily harm.182 The law can thus
be perceived as granting, in many violent confrontations not
involving threatened deadly force, death or great bodily harm,
an illusory right of self-defense; that is, as a practical matter, no
right at all. The public may well react adversely to this hypoc-
risy in the law, considering it of minimal help at best and at
worse debilitating.
Insisting that a citizen threatened "only" with physical
force or a "mere" battery forego the immediate private right of
effective self-defense in exchange for a deferred public remedy
of criminal prosecution may have made more sense in an era in
181. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
182. It should be noted that the law of Washington, the common law, and the law of
other states permit use of deadly force by citizens in situations other than the defense of
personal bodily integrity. The law will permit persons to use deadly force to prevent
certain felonies. For example, WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.050 (1981), in effect purportedly
permits the use of deadly force by a citizen "in the actual resistance of an attempt to
commit a felony upon the slayer, in his presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place
of abode, in which he is." See supra note 34. This statute has been construed by prose-
cutors to preclude prosecution of persons who kill criminals during the course of an
actual burglary of their homes (Personal conversation with David Boerner, former chief
criminal deputy, King County Prosecuting Attorney, Oct. 12, 1982). This statutory for-
mulation, however, still leaves difficult questions unresolved. For example, it is not clear
what should be the result if the slayer honestly and reasonably but mistakenly believed
that the person slain was committing a felony such as burglary in his dwelling, or if the
person slain was within the home but had not committed a further act which would
constitute a burglary or an attempted burglary in the slayer's home while the slayer was
present. Cf. State v. Griffith, 91 Wash. 2d 572, 589 P.2d 799 (1979) (court held that
unlawful trespass into the dwelling of another does not, by itself, constitute such feloni-
ous activity or threat of danger as will justify use of deadly force against trespasser).
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which subsequent arrest and successful prosecution of the
aggressor were more likely. Given the increased violence of our
times and the statistical likelihood that a majority of violent
aggressors will in fact not be successfully apprehended and pun-
ished,18 many victims will be without any remedy, private or
public. The better social policy is to recognize the extremely
contingent nature of the public remedy and to increase the
availability and efficacy of private remedies authorized by the
law, lest unlawful violence continue without any effective
restraint, private or public.
The present formulation of the law of self-defense, in its
attempt to minimize social loss, has adopted a utilitarian scheme
of justice without explicitly acknowledging its underlying philo-
sophic premise.18 Adopting this premise condemns many indi-
vidual victims to bear the primary cost of minimizing social loss.
Maximizing the preservation of human life by inexorably dis-
tributing a significant personal burden of physical harm and
psychic scarring to many innocent citizens chosen at random by
violent aggressors may no longer accord with society's sense of
social good. The abstract goal of preserving human life must be
tempered with the recognition that the people whose lives are
being protected by the law are frequently violent criminals who
are thus free to prey again on society.
Even if one accepts this utilitarian premise, it is not clear
that society currently agrees with the answer generated many
years ago by the common law's reckoning on the utilitarian
calculus. It is submitted that society today would not choose to
preserve the lives of violent aggressors at the expense of physical
and psychic harm to innocent victims. Interest balancing always
contains a large degree of subjective value preference and courts
may not be the institution best suited to gauge society's prefer-
ences. In any event, it seems quite clear that the legislature can
reach a different conclusion in measuring the utilitarian prefer-
183. The chances of being caught and imprisoned for a crime are very slight. Eighty
percent of those who commit crimes are not caught. L. FoRaE, THE DEATH OF THE LAW
191 (1975). For example, there are roughly 130,000 felony arrests in New York State each
year. Approximately 8,000 of those arrested go to prison. In 1979, the national arrest
rates for selected violent crimes were: 73% for murder; 53% for aggravated assault; 48%
for rape; 25% for robbery; 15% for burglary. Why the Justice System Fails, TIME,
March 23, 1981, at 22. Crimes committed by strangers have grown far more rapidly than
crimes committed by acquaintances. Thus, police have been able to make proportionally
fewer arrests. C. SnMERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTCE 219 (1978).
184. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
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ences of society.
There are other cogent criticisms that can be made of the
limitation on the use of deadly force in self-defense. As observed
previously,'"8 limiting the right to use deadly force to instances
in which deadly force is threatened may insure an ineffective
response to violence. The victim may, once subjugated, only suf-
fer physical harm together with the psychic scarring which usu-
ally accompanies such violence.' 8 It is also possible, however,
that the aggressor will proceed to inflict even more serious dam-
age on a victim once subjugation is complete and the possibility
of resistance has been terminated. Indeed, the very helplessness
of the victim may invite further aggression since there is virtu-
ally no present risk of resistance and harm to the aggressor. This
fear is not unfounded. For, it is precisely the random and unpre-
dictable nature of violence, the possibility of unforeseen shifting
aggressor objectives, and escalation in the level of aggressor vio-
lence after the initial confrontation that are so bewildering
today.18 7 It is not unusual to read about purse snatchings, mug-
gings, and other crimes initially involving nondeadly force that
result in appalling harm to the victim including death.'" If ini-
tial aggressor threats of mere physical harm in fact frequently
explode unpredictably into instances in which aggressors cause
death or serious bodily harm, then even utilitarian objectives
may not be furthered by the present law.
In its current formulation, the law of self-defense effectively
creates a strong evidentiary presumption about the nature of the
harm threatened to the victim based on the nature of the force
threatened by the aggressor.189 As a practical matter most juries
are unlikely to conclude that a victim reasonably feared death or
serious bodily injury at the hands of the aggressor unless the
aggressor was armed with a deadly weapon or other deadly
force.190 This inference of fact seems both unnecessarily rigid
185. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Farber, Manhattan Crime Victims Tell of Despair and Emotional
Scars, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1982, at 15, col. 1; Meyer & Goodman, Marauders from
Inner City Prey on L.A.'s Suburbs, L.A. Times, July 12, 1981, at 1, ol. 1; Busier, For
Some Victims of Crime, the Fear Never Leaves, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1981 at 6, col. 1;
Machlowitz, Emotional Injury in Assaults Assessed, N.Y. Times, April 6, 1981, at 11,
col. 4. See generally C. SELBE.aM., CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978).
187. See authorities cited supra note 186.
188. See authorities cited supra note 186.
189. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 172.
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and incongruent with experience.19'
Predicting violence is at best a difficult task.' 92 Predicting
the level of violence or the outcome of a violent confrontation is
no easier. Nor is there any necessary logical correlation between
what harm an aggressor intends to inflict and the force he has at
his disposal. Certainly, the actual threat or use of deadly force
ought to permit the victim reasonably to fear that the aggressor
intends to inflict death or serious bodily harm on him. It is not
clear, however, that the presence of deadly force is a necessary
factual predicate for such fear. Rather the presence, use, or
threat of deadly force ought simply to be one fact among others
for the jury to consider in determining what the victim reasona-
bly feared.' 93
Violent confrontations normally occur under conditions of
uncertainty. Frequently they are of short duration and without
warning. They may also occur in situations in which the victim
may be at an extreme disadvantage in gauging the level of vio-
lence or harm threatened or the intention of the aggressor.194
Perhaps the paradigm case testing whether the current law
of self-defense makes sense is the nighttime burglary of a resi-
dence when the lawful occupants do not know whether the
intruder is armed or what his objective is in entering the
home. 195 It makes no sense to have rules of self-defense which
impose the drastic disadvantage generated by the uncertainty of
the confrontation on innocent parties. Yet the current rules of
self-defense may do just that. In Washington, for example, occu-
pants of a home may use deadly force if they are imminently
threatened with death or bodily harm or if the aggressor
attempts to commit a felony on the victim or in their home.'
191. See supra note 186.
192. Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerous-
ness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1084 (1976); Ennis & Litwack,
Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CALIF. L. REv. 693 (1974); Kozol, Boucher & Garofali, The Diagnosis and Treatment of
Dangerousness, 18 Cims & DELINQ. 371 (1972); Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in
Mentally Ill Criminals, 27 ARCH. GEN. PsYcH. 397 (1972); Steadman, Some Evidence on
the Inadequacy of the Concept and Determinations of Dangerousness in Law and Psy-
chiatry, 1 J. PSYCH. & L. 409 (1973).
193. See supra notes 37, 48.
194. It is precisely because the stakes for victims are extraordinarily high, and the
opportunity for decision and action usually so minimal, that legal rules governing vic-
tims' responses must be fairly simple yet comprehensible.
195. See supra note 182.
196. See supra note 182. Delaware has just passed legislation which seems to strike
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These rules may require the lawful occupants to make factual
inquiry, once an intruder has been detected in the house, suffi-
cient to ascertain the aggressor's objectives.
Since he has created the potentially violent confrontation
fully aware of his intention and his capability for violence, the
aggressor is not so disadvantaged. Moreover, he has chosen to
intrude into the home, the most personal zone of autonomy and
security each citizen enjoys in our society. The abstract objective
of preserving human life does not seem sufficiently persuasive to
justify limiting the victim's resort to deadly force only to those
instances in which he has clarified the facts and knows that the
intruder is armed with deadly force or is threatening death or
serious bodily injury or intends to commit a felony on the victim
or in his home. Requiring further factual inquiry on the part of
the victim may well disadvantage him even more and shift the
odds enormously in favor of the aggressor.
With the possible exception of the problem of mistakes, no
compelling argument can be offered that would justify requiring
the victim to bear the risk of uncertainty generated by the
aggressor's unlawful conduct. The aggressor has initiated the
violent confrontation and the concomitant uncertainty. It is dif-
ficult to accept the logic and value of rules which, most citizens
probably believe, generate an intolerable allocation of risk to
innocent citizens in such paradigmatic cases. It seems far more
preferable that all disadvantages which flow from such uncer-
tainty should be allocated to the person who has caused the situ-
ation to occur.
Finally, an organized police force and the other apparatus of
public security are simply not adequate by themselves to the
tasks of controlling violent crime and of protecting ordinary peo-
a more reasonable balance between imposing a risk of harm on the lawful occupant and
requiring him to clarify the factual situation before using deadly force in self-defense. A
new section of the Delaware Code provides:
Same-Person Unlawfully in a Dwelling. In the prosecution of an occupant of
a dwelling charged with killing or injuring an intruder who was unlawfully in
said dwelling, it shall be a defense that the occupant was in his own dwelling at
the time of the offense, and: (a) the encounter between the occupant and
intruder was sudden and unexpected, compelling the occupant to act instantly;
or (b) the occupant reasonably believed that the intruder would inflict personal
injury upon the occupant or others in the dwelling; or (c) the occupant
demanded that the intruder disarm or surrender, and the intruder refused to
do so.
H.R.J. Res. 695, 131st Leg., 1982 Del. Laws - (19-) (to be codified at 11 Del. Laws §
496).
[Vol. 6:237
Self-Defense and Deadly Force
ple. Enhancing the ability of the private citizen to engage in
effective self-defense will help provide the means of assuring
personal security that the state can no longer insure. 97
VII. THE PROPER FORMULATION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-
DEFENSE
The private right of self-defense should be grounded prima-
rily in the theory of personal autonomy.'98 The utilitarian theory
of self-defense as a form of necessity 99 should continue to be
relevant to the scope of the right but only as a subordinated
principle of limitation.
Accordingly, the private right of self-defense should be care-
fully expanded in order to permit innocent victims to respond
effectively to unlawful violence against their persons. At the very
core of the proposed change is the premise that effectiveness of
response should be the paramount principle of authorization
rather than proportionality. This change will acknowledge that
an innocent victim need not endure unlawful violence to his per-
son (with all its attendant risk of unknown outcome, including
his possible death) in exchange for the forlorn hope of subse-
quent arrest and successful prosecution of the aggressor at some
unknown time in the future.
There are, then, two essential substantive adjustments that
should be made in the right of self-defense. First, the rule
should focus on the threat to the victim and not on the instru-
mentality used by the aggressor. Thus, the right to use deadly
force in self-defense ought to arise whenever an innocent victim
honestly and reasonably believes that he is threatened with
unlawful violence. There is no compelling reason why the right
of self-defense and, more importantly, the scope of the right
should depend on the nature of the force (deadly or nondeadly)
used by the aggressor or be limited to instances when the victim
appears to be threatened with death or great bodily harm. This
limitation creates a strong presumption about the aggressor's
intention and capability (and therefore, about the likely out-
come) based on the armament of the aggressor. 200 It also imposes
on the innocent victim the risk of ascertaining whether the
197. See supra note 29.
198. See supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 7-20 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 47-50.
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aggressor is using or threatening deadly force or is threatening
to kill or inflict great bodily harm under very difficult and rap-
idly changing circumstances. Even more importantly, the rule
which limits victims to nondeadly force when the aggressor uses
nondeadly force or does not appear to be threatening death or
serious bodily injury imposes a drastic disadvantage on victims
who are physically weaker than their aggressors.
Second, the rules governing self-defense should be changed
to permit the victim to respond only with that force which he
honestly and reasonably believes to be necessary and effective to
repel the aggressor and to prevent the infliction of unlawful vio-
lence on himself. On the one hand, this rule, as stated, maintains
the principle of proportionality. That is, the victim cannot use
greater force than is reasonably required to repel the aggressor
and to avoid the harm threatened. 01 On the other hand, it does
not limit the level of force available to the victim and does not,
thereby, require weaker victims to suffer gratuitous beatings. It
is a principle both of authorization and of limitation.
The proposed substantive changes can be articulated in a
variety of ways. The following formulation seems an appropriate
point of departure for purposes of initiating discussion and
change:
(a) Self-defense. In any prosecution for using, or attempt-
ing to use, force against the person of another, it shall be an
affirmative defense that the defendant acted in self-defense.
(b) A person acts in self-defense when he honestly and
reasonably believes that: (i) he is imminently threatened by
another with unlawful physical violence to his person; and (ii)
such force, including deadly force, is necessary to protect him-
self effectively.
These changes, it is submitted, are in accord with society's
attitudes about unlawful personal aggression. They permit inno-
cent victims to preserve their personal autonomy and bodily
integrity if threatened with unlawful aggression. They permit
victims to do what is necessary-but no more than what is nec-
essary-to protect themselves. And, consistent with the long-
standing common law tradition, by imposing the standard of
201. Thus, for example, a victim confronted by an aggressor who resorts to deadly
force in self-defense may be required to warn his aggressor, if feasible, that he is pre-
pared to use deadly force in self-defense. Such a requirement would help insure that loss
of life would not occur unless really necessary.
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reasonableness these proposed changes require all citizens to
abide by a standard of common social responsibility applicable
to all.
Giving primacy to the personal autonomy theory of self-
defense and formulating the substantive rules of self-defense
accordingly will simply recognize that, in these violent times, an
individual ought to be entitled to take whatever steps are neces-
sary to defend his zone of personal security and to preserve
intact his bodily integrity. However, the revision is not necessa-
rily incompatible with the utilitarian theory of justice underly-
ing the traditional common law formulation of self-defense. The
traditional cost/benefit assessment of the common law assumed
that an aggressor not armed with deadly force did not intend to,
and generally would not, kill his victim or inflict serious bodily
harm. That assumption is open to serious doubt today. More-
over it also assumed a pattern of violent confrontation between
participants of rough physical parity. Again, that is no longer
the case, as increasingly victims are drawn from physically dis-
advantaged classes. Our contemporary concern with equality
militates in favor of legal rules which adjust for disadvantage
rather than preserving inequality which flows from characteris-
tics of gender or other attributes beyond an individual's
control.2 0 2
Furthermore, it is no longer clear that society regards pre-
serving the life or limb of violent criminals as a value superior to
preserving the physical integrity and psychological health of
innocent victims. In fact, a good case can be made that striking
the balance in favor of violent criminals increases the general
disrespect for criminal law which seems to be increasing.203
Finally, this view of the right of self-defense and the broad
scope of authorization which is thereby created may enhance the
general deterrent impact of permitting victims to use force
202. There is some evidence that females suffer from cultural bias which is exacer-
bated by the current law whenever they seek to use deadly force in self-defense. Brown,
A Double Standard at Work in Self-Defense Cases, Too, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Nov.
14, 1982, at B1, col. 1. The proposed changes do not require gender-specific rules of self-
defense. Rather, they permit the jury to consider the defendant's physical ability to
respond effectively to aggression. Personal characteristics of victims thus are made rele-
vant by the proposed rule change, but there is no need to pack such characteristics into
statutes.
203. Busler, For Some Victims of Crime, The Fear Never Leaves, N.Y. Times, May
5, 1981, at A6, col. 1.
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against aggressors. 2 Aggressors, put at greater risk by this par-
ticular concept of self-defense and the rules implementing it,
may be more reluctant to resort to violence to effectuate their
unlawful desires once they become aware that they do so at
greater personal risk.20 5 If this were the case, then expanding the
right to use deadly force in self-defense might result in less loss
of life or other physical harm generally as aggressors become less
emboldened.0 6
Since these proposed changes in the substantive rules gov-
erning self-defense would expand the right and scope of the
privilege of self-defense, it seems appropriate to treat the doc-
trine as an affirmative defense imposing on victims the burden
of producing evidence and the burden of ultimate persuasion.
This structure of criminal law recognizes, as does the common
law, that the intentional infliction of harm on another human
being is, based on general experience, presumptively proscribed
behavior.2 08 Therefore, one who acts in such a manner had bet-
ter have a good reason for causing such harm in order to avoid
personal criminal responsibility. Treating self-defense as an
affirmative defense also acknowledges that the defendant has
better access to evidence concerning his motivation which is the
204. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 860-75 (1978).
205. Whether expanding the right of victims to resort to effective force, including
deadly force, will in fact deter aggressors from initiating violent confrontations is an
empirical question that can only be answered with any certainty by accurate social sci-
ence techniques. Kadish apparently rejects this rationale for self-defense though his
arguments do not appear persuasive. See Kadish, Respect for Life, supra note 17, at 882-
83. But Weschler and Michael, in their important early work on homicide, considered
this objective an important and valid consideration in the formulation of the rules of
self-defense. They concluded: "Given the choice that must be made [between saving the
life of the aggressor or that of the innocent victim], the only defensible policy is one that
will operate as a sanction against unlawful aggression." Weschler & Michael, A Rationale
of the Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701, 737 (1937).
206. This assumes that aggressors, before initiating violent confrontations, engage in
rational decisionmaking, which would include an assessment of the nature and degree of
resistance the victim is likely to offer. This assumption may be more valid when the
aggressor plans his violent conduct (e.g., in mugging or in burglary) than when the
aggressor acts with minimal forethought (e.g., in bar room brawls or in domestic dis-
putes). Even the drafters of the Model Penal Code concluded that the use of deadly
force in self-defense is a private sanction that might operate as a deterrent to aggressors
though they generally preferred public sanctions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 com-
ment at 24-25 (Tent. Draft No. 8 1958).
207. See supra notes 77-103 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the
proposed formulation of the right of self-defense is an expanded version of the common
law version and thus should clearly fall within the rationale of Patterson v. New York,
432 U.S 197 (1975). See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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crucial inquiry in self-defense. This allocation of the burden of
proof also properly takes into account the concern society has
with making mistakes in legal adjudication and in deterring
feigning. 209
VIII. MEETING COUNTER ARGUMENTS
Are there compelling counter-arguments that should per-
suade us not to make the changes recommended here?
Perhaps the most difficult counter-argument is that the pro-
posed expansion of the right of self-defense will generate "hard
cases" of another kind; namely, that the law would authorize
victims to take human life when in fact they were threatened
with a very slight, unlawful physical force such as a push or a
shove. The use of the term "violence" in the proposed formula-
tion is intended to make clear that more than minimal uncon-
sented touching would normally be required before the right to
self-defense arose. Moreover, it is likely that juries will in fact
interpret the statutory rule in a common sense fashion on the
facts of each case. 10
It also may be argued that these changes in the law would
cause an escalation of violence with increased loss of life or seri-
ous bodily harm. Obviously, this is an empirical question which
cannot be answered solely by intellectual analysis. On the one
hand, expanding the right of victims to respond with deadly
force and self-defense may increase the loss of life or serious
bodily harm. On the other hand, expanding this right might
increase general deterrence against violent assaults by criminals,
thereby actually reducing violence and its accompanying poten-
tial for death or injury." Even if the deterrent effect does not
materialize, adjusting the law as suggested at least effectuates a
more desirable allocation of risk of harm between aggressor and
victim.
An argument also can be made that any change in the law
which may increase the potential for loss of life or serious injury
cheapens the value society places on human life and bodily
integrity. Though plausible enough, this argument fails to take
209. See supra notes 41, 88 and accompanying text.
210. Juries are frequently required to engage in "factfinding" on matters which are
not susceptible of empirical proof. Rather, they involve issues of community judgment
such as "reasonableness" or "substantiality." Cf. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
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into account the damage done to the social fabric by laws that
seriously disadvantage innocent victims and allocate to them sig-
nificant risks of bodily injury and even death. If the law is per-
ceived as confirming disadvantages and as protecting criminal
aggressors, it should come as no great surprise that society
would consider it as enslaving rather than as protective and,
therefore, not worthy of respect.21 2
Arguably, the changes will be seen as a confession that the
apparatus of public order is not working and that the law, in
expanding the private right of self-help, is tacitly admitting the
failure of public systems of social order. It also may reinforce the
"seige mentality" that unfortunately permeates society today.
Frankly, this may well be the case. However, it seems preferable
to conform the law to reality rather than to preserve a false
facade of social order.
IX. CONCLUSION
The majesty of the common law has been its ability to
adapt to changing social conditions. Unfortunately, there is an
increase today in violent crimes against the person and a con-
comitant inability of the social apparatus of law enforcement to
cope with this phenomenon. In order to insure that innocent cit-
izens have a meaningful right to life and bodily integrity and
that society has some minimal confidence in the law as the pro-
tector of individual rights and public order, the law of self-
defense should be changed by the legislature to permit an inno-
cent victim to use whatever force he honestly and reasonably
believes is necessary to protect himself effectively against unlaw-
ful violence to his person.
212. It should be emphasized that the expanded right of self-defense espoused here
is limited to instances in which the victim is seeking to protect himself by preventing
unlawful violence to his person by an aggressor. It is not intended to authorize vigilan-
teism; i.e., using deadly force as retributive punishment to execute or maim persons who
have already committed violence against others. See 4 W. BLAcKsTON , CoMMNTAms
ON THE LAws OF ENGLAND 179, 184 (Oxford 1769). There is some evidence in the popular
culture which suggests that law-abiding citizens are increasingly enamored of the aveng-
ing hero. See Trombetta, Criminals, Beware: The Screen Avengers are Coming!, L.A.
Times, July 12, 1981, (Calendar) at 1, col. 1.
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